Petition

81-5700

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

NO.

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

JOSEPH MACALUSO

Petitioner

vs

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
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Joseph Macaluso petitions for a Writ of Certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in this case.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I. WHETHER AS A MATTER OF LAW THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND RULES 8 AND 14 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WERE VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT MACALUSO'S MOTIONS FOR SEVERANCE?

II. WHETHER THE RICO STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS WRITTEN AND APPLIED?

III. ADOPTION OF CO-DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS.

LIST OF PARTIES

ROSARIO PALERMO

WILLIAM H. BROWN a/k/a BILL

JOHN D. FISHER

ROBERT D. YOUNG

JOSEPH MACALUSO a/k/a JOE

FRANK SCIONTI

SAM C. MARTINO

PAUL GUARINO

JIMMY FARINA

BERTON B. CHASE a/k/a BERT

ROLANDO GONZALEZ RODRIGUEZ a/k/a ROLAND RODRIGUEZ

JOSEPH C. RUSSELLO a/k/a JOE

AMALIA MORGADO

JOSEPH D. LAZZARA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Questions Presented.....1
List of Parties.....2
Table of Contents.....3
Table of Authorities.....4
Citation of Opinion Below.....5
Grounds for Jurisdiction.....5
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved.....5
Statement of the Case.....13
Basis for Federal Jurisdiction.....27
Reasons for Granting the Writ.....27
Point I.....28
Point II.....34
Point III.....36
Conclusion.....36
Appendix A.....A-1
Appendix B.....B-1

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES — PAGES

1. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935).....32

2. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1945).....27,28,31,32, 33,34

3. United States v. Turkette, _____U.S._____, 101 S.Ct. 2524 (1981).....35

4. Kotteakos v. United States, 151 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1945).....32

5. Peterson v. U.S., 344 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1965).....29

6. United States v. Eckeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965).....29

7. United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir. 1965).....28,30

8. United States v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1976).....35

9. United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981).....5,27,30,31, 33,34

10. United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977).....29

11. United States v. Central Supply Ass'n., 6 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Ohio 1947).....34

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

U.S. CONST. amend. V.....5

STATUTES

18 U.S.C. §2.....7,15

18 U.S.C. §1341.....7,13,151

18 U.S.C. §1961.....8,9,,10,34

18 U.S.C. §1962.....10,11,13,15,35

18 U.S.C. §1963.....15

18 U.S.C. §3231.....27

18 U.S.C. §4205(b)(2).....17

28 U.S.C. §1254(1).....5

Fla. Stat. §777.011.....11,13

Fla. Stat. §806.01.....11,12,13

Fla. Stat. §806.02, now 806.01(2).....12,13

Fla. Stat. §806.06, now 817.233.....12,13

RULES OF PROCEDURE

Fed. R. Crim. P. 8.....6,28

Fed. R. Crim. P. 14.....6,28

CITATION OF OPINION BELOW

The opinion sought to be reviewed is United States v. Martino, et al, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981).

GROUNDS FOR JURISDICTION

The opinion of the appellate court was filed on June 19, 1981. (Appendix A) A stay of the issuance of the mandate was granted until December 10, 1981. An order denying Macaluso's motion for rehearing was filed on September 17, 1981. (Appendix B).

The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment below by Writ of Certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1254(1):

> §1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari; appeal; certified questions.
> Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods:
>
> (1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after rendition of judgment or decree;

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS INVOLVED

Amendment V to the United States Constitution.

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subjected for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life; liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 8:

Rule 8. Joinder of Offenses and of Defendants.

(a) Joinder of Offenses. Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

(b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.

FED. R. CRIM. P. 14:

Rule 14. Relief from Prejudicial Joinder

If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.

18 U.S.C. §2:

§ 2. Principals

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.

(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

18 U.S.C. §1341:

§1341. Frauds and swindles.

Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

18 U.S.C. §1961:

§1961. Definitions

As used in this chapter -

(1) "racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code; Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title II, fraud in the sale of

securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States;

(2) "State" means any State of the United States the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof;

(3) "person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;

(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

(6) "unlawful debt" means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate;

(7) "racketeering investigator" means any attorney or investigator so designated by the Attorney General and

charged with the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect this chapter;

(8) "racketeering investigation" means any inquiry conducted by any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has been involved in any violation of this chapter or of any final order, judgment, or decree of any court of the United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under this chapter;

(9) "documentary material" includes any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material; and

(10) "Attorney General" includes the Attorney General of the United States, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, any Assistant Attorney General of the United States, or any employee of the Department of Justice or any employee of any department or agency of the United States so designated by the Attorney General to carry out the powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter. Any department or agency so designated may use in investigations authorized by this chapter either the investigative provisions of this chapter or the investigative power of such department or agency otherwise conferred by law.

18 U.S.C. §1962:

§1962. Prohibited activities

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of

assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.

(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.

(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

Fla. Stat. §777.011

777.011 Principal in first degree.

Whoever commits any criminal offense against the state, whether felony or misdemeanor, or aids, abets, counsels, hires, or otherwise procures such offense to be committed, and such offense is committed or is attempted to be committed, is a principal in the first degree and may be charged, convicted, and punished as such, whether he is or is not actually or constructively present at the commission of such offense.

Fla. Stat. §806.01 (includes former Fla. Stat. 806.02):

806.01 Arson.

(1) Any person who willfully and maliciously, by fire or explosive, damages any structure, whether the property of himself

or another, knowing, or with reasonable grounds to believe, that a human being is in the structure, shall be guilty of arson in the first degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s.775.082, s.775.083, or s.775.084.

(2) Any person who willfully and maliciously, by fire or explosive, damages any structure, whether the property of himself or another, under any circumstances not referred to in subsection (1), shall be guilty of arson in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s.775.082, s. 775.083, or s.775.084.

(3) "Structure" means any building of any kind, any enclosed area with a roof over it, and any vehicle, vessel, or aircraft.

Fla. Stat. §817.233 (formerly Fla. Stat. 806.06):

817.233 Burning to defraud the insurer.

Any person who willfully and with intent to injure or defraud the insurer sets fire to or burns or attempts so to do or who causes to be burned or who aids, counsels or procures the burning of any building, structure or personal property, of whatsoever class or character, whether the property of himself or of another, which shall at the time be insured by any person against loss or damage by fire, shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s.775.082, s.775.083, or s.775.084.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

(i) Course of Proceedings and Dispositions in Court Below

Petitioner, Joseph Macaluso, was indicted by a grand jury in the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, in case number 77-00083-Cr-TH, on June 8, 1977. The original indictment contained eighty-three (83) pages and thirty-five (35) counts in which petitioner Macaluso was charged in nine counts. (vol.,pg.1)

Count I charged all twenty-three (23) defendants with conspiracy to conduct and participate in the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §1962(d). Count I alleges that all twenty-three (23) defendants were associated together as an enterprise for the purpose of defrauding certain insurance companies by the use of mails and by committing or causing to be committed acts of arson in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 and Sections 806.01, 806.02, 806.06, 817.223 and 777.011 of the Florida Statutes. Count I further alleged that as part of the conspiracy all of the defendants would conduct the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, including:

(1) The defendants and others would commit multiple acts of mail fraud and arson;

(2) Defendant Carter, an insurance adjuster, would adjust numerous fraudulent property loss claims in return for a portion of the insurance monies received by members of the enterprise, and would direct memebers of the enterprise to particular agencies for the purpose of acquiring fire insurance coverage on property intended for burning;

(3) Defendant Gomez, the fire marshal of the City of Tampa, Florida, would provide members of the enterprise with information concerning current investigations being conducted by his office into arson activities of the enterprise;

(4) Defendant Martino, a realtor, would find, acquire, and finance the purchase and repairs of property intended to be burned by the enterprise;

(5) Defendant Chase would arrange financing of repairs and fire insurance premiums for a building intended to be burned;

(6) Defendants Carter, Guarino, Martino, Noriega, Macaluso, Morgado, Fisher, Young and Holt, would acquire or cause to be acquired certain buildings for the purpose of burning;

(7) Defendants Guarino, Palermo, Noriega, Macaluso, Morgado, Martino, Gomez, Chase, Carter, Fisher, and Young made minor repairs to the building in order to obtain maximum fire insurance coverage;

(8) Defendants Carter, Guarino, Scionti, Rivera, Lostracco, Morgado, and Palermo would arrange for members of the enterprise to burn the buildings for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining insurance money;

(9) Defendants Guarino, Scionti, Noriega, Arrigo, Holt, and Macaluso would act as arsonists who actually burned buildings for the enterprise;

(10) Defendants Farina, Fernandez, Lazzara, Rodriguez, Russello, Palermo, Brown, Fisher, Young, Stark, Holt, Macaluso, Guarino, Noriega, Gomez, Morgado, Scionti and Martino used the arson services of the enterprise to burn buildings they had a financial interest in, in order to fraudulently obtain insurance money; and

(11) Defendants Lazzara, Palermo, Scionti, Rodriguez, Macaluso, Farina, Noriega, Guarino, Morgado, Martino, Fernandez, Stark, Russello, Carter, Holt and others would receive insurance company drafts in payment and settlement of fraudulent property loss claims arising out of the arsons committed by members of the enterprise.

Count I further alleges sixty-nine (69) overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy including the burning of one property in Miami, Florida and twenty (20) properties in Tampa, Florida. Petitioner Macaluso was named in four overt acts (11, 18, 20 and 21) involving two of the twenty-one (21) properties specified.

Count 2 of the indictment alleges that all the defendants, except Chase, with conducting the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1962(c). Count 2 alleges that all the defendants, except Chase, were associated together in fact as an enterprise for the purpose of defrauding certain insurance companies by the use of the mails and by committing acts of arson. The pattern of racketeering activity alleged in Count 2 was that the defendants and others committed multiple acts of mail fraud and arson. Count 2 further charged fifty-six (56) specific acts of racketeering of which the first thirty-three (33) are an incorporation by reference of the thirty-three (33) substantive mail fraud counts (Count 3 - 35). Specifically, Petitioner Macaluso was charged with ten acts of racketeering (Counts 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 21, 22 and acts number 38, 40 and 44). Count 2 further sought twenty-six (26) forfeitures pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1963(a) and (c), criminal forfeiture to the United States of property in or acquired through the operation of a racketeering enterprise. The government specifically sought two forfeitures against Joseph Macaluso (7 and 8).

Counts 3 through 35 of the indictment allege violation of 18 U.S.C. §§2 and 1341, for the use of the mails to defraud fire insurance companies arising out of sixteen (16) separate alleged schemes to defraud insurance companies. The various mailings consisted of letters, reports, memorandums, proofs of loss and drafts sent or received by various attorneys, fire insurance companies, insurance agencies and adjusters.

All of the defendants, except Chase, who is named only in Count 1, were charged with at least two counts of mail fraud. Petitioner Macaluso was charged in Counts 7 and 8 together with defendants Rodriguez, Carter, Guarino, and Noriega with two counts of mail fraud arising out of the fire at 2208 10th Street and 923 12th Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Macaluso was further charged with mail fraud in Counts 11, 12 and 13 together with defendants Martino, Carter, Morgado, Guarino and Noriega arising

out of the fire at 3006 North Nebraska Avenue, Tampa, Florida. Petitioner Macaluso was also charged in Counts 21 and 22 with mail fraud together with defendants Holt, Morgado, Arrigo and Noriega arising out of the fire at 3310 Vasconia Street, Tampa, Florida.

On June 16, 1977, Petitioner Macaluso entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. Prior to trial, defendants Noriega, Carter and Arrigo pled guilty to all charges pursuant to written agreements with the government setting sentencing limitations of five years, five years and seven years respectively for each of the three defendants.

Petitioner Macaluso's motion for bill of particulars (vol. 2, pg. 33), motion for relief from prejudicial joinder and for severance (vol. 2, pg. 40), motion to produce grand jury transcripts (vol. 8, pg. 158), motion for relief from misjoinder (vol. 8, pg. 166), motion for review of Magistrate's order (vol. 8, pg. 167), motion to allow participation in voir dire (vol. 8, pg. 168), motion to dismiss (vol. 8, pg. 169), motion for discovery and inspection (vol. 8, pg. 171) which were denied (vol. 6, pgs. 245, 271).

On November 7, 1977 trial began in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division, under the provisions of Title XVIII, United States Code. The government began the presentation of its case-in-chief on November 14, 1977 (vol. 47, pg. 26) and concluded on December 14, 1977 (vol. 69, pg. 5), during which it presented seventy-six (76) witnesses and introduced ovber 250 exhibits (vol. 47 - 69). On December 16, 1977 the court granted Petitioner Macaluso's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 21 and 22 of the indictment. (vol. 3, pg. 372; vol. 70, pgs. 174, 175). The court further ordered that Count 1, paragraph 3(j), Count 2, paragraph 5(44), Count 2, paragraph 6(7) and Count 2, paragraph 6(8) of the indictment stricken as to Petitioner Macaluso. (vol. 70, pgs. 168 - 171). Petitioner Macaluso's motion for judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1 and 2, and renewal of all motions filed before and during trial were severally denied.

On December 19, 1977 defense began its case and concluded on January 18, 1978, during which 108 witnesses testified including eight of the defendants (vol. 18 - 36, 71 - 80). Petitioner Macaluso did not testify or offer any evidence. On January 18 and 19, 1978 the government presented eight witnesses in rebuttal. (vol. 37 - 39 and 81). Petitioner Macaluso renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal which the court reserved ruling on and submitted the issues to the jury (vol. 82, pgs. 38 - 45, 84).

On January 26, 1978 the court instructed the jury and they began their deliberations (vol. 90, pgs. 180 - 240; vol. 3, pg. 381). The jury deliberated from January 28, 1978 until February 24, 1978 at which time it returned its verdicts (vol. 84, pgs. 146 - 161).

Defendants, Gomez, Fernandez, Rivera and Stark were found not guilty of all charges (vol. 84, pgs. 148 - 151). Petitioner Macaluso was found guilty as to Counts 1, 2, 7, 8, 11, 12, and 13. (vol. 84, pg. 154). On Counts 11, 12 and 13, defendants Morgado (vol. 84, pg. 153), Martino (vol. 84, pg. 152), and Guarino were found guilty (vol. 84, pgs. 156, 157).

Petitioner Macaluso's motion for a new trial, motion to arrest judgment, and motion for judgment of acquittal were denied (vol. 4, pgs. 426 - 428, 435).

On April 21, 1978, the court adjudged Petitioner Macaluso guilty and sentenced him to prison for nine years as to Count 1, nine years as to Count 2, to be served concurrently, and five years each as to Counts 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13, all to be served concurrently with each other and concurrently with Counts 1 and 2, pursuant to Title XVIII 4205(b)(2). (vol. 4, pg. 459; vol. 92, pgs. 137 - 139). On April 25, 1978, Petitioner Macaluso timely filed his notice of appeal (vol. 4, pg. 467).

(ii) Statement of Facts

The theory of the government's case as expressed in its opening statement was, "that this is a relatively simple case involving the burning of property for the purpose of defrauding

the insurance companies out of very substantial sums of money." (vol. 46, pg. 3). The government went on to state that in Count 1 of the indictment all of the defendants were charged with conspiring to conduct and participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity involving arson and mail fraud, and in Count 2 that all of the defendants, with the exception of defendant Chase, were charged with actually unlawfully participating in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activities which involved mail fraud and arson. (vol. 46, pg. 4).

According to the government's theory, "each defendant had certain responsibilities to insure that the enterprise functioned smoothly and most importantly of all that the enterprise generated a profit. The duties of the various defendants often overlapped and this is because their duties were very, very closely interrelated". (vol. 46, pg. 5).

The theory of the government's case against Petitioner Macaluso, was that he was a supplier of properties (vol. 46, pgs. 6 - 7), that he was a business representative of the enterprise soliciting arsons for the enterprise (vol. 46, pg. 8), and that he was an arsonist for the enterprise (vol. 46, pg. 9). Specifically, the government alleged that Petitioner Macaluso contacted Noriega about burning a two family single story house and two story garage apartment located at 2208 10th Street and 923 12th Avenue in Tampa; that Petitioner Macaluso together with defendants Noriega and Guarino burned the buildings and that Petitioner Macaluso was paid by defendant Noriega (vol. 46, pgs. 14, 15); that Noriega and defendant Guarino sold the property located at 3006 North Nebraska to defendant Morgado and put the title to the property in Macaluso's name and the property was burned eighteen days after Petitioner Macaluso purchased fire insurance on the property (vol. 46, pgs. 16, 17).

The mainstay of the government's case was the testimony of two co-defendants, Willie Noriega and Joseph Carter. Noriega testified that he was recruited by defendants Scionti and Guarino

in early 1973 as an arsonist following a fire at 1202 East Buffalo Avenue in September, 1972 (vol. 49, pgs. 3 - 10). Noriega testified that Scionti and Guarino told him that they could expect:

1. Defendant Gomez, the fire marshal, would tell them about arson investigations and stake outs so they would not get caught (vol. 49, pgs. 10, 11).

2. Defendant Martino, a realtor, worked with them, and would finance the purchase of properties that would be bought for the purpose of burning, as well as direct them to cheap, decrepit and condemned properties (vol. 49, pg. 11).

3. Defendant Carter, an insurance adjuster, worked with them, and would direct them to fire insurance companies which he could make quick settlements with (vol. 49, pgs. 12, 13).

Noriega further told the jury that he participated in the burning of all the properties alleged in the indictment except the one at 1202 East Buffalo Avenue (vol. 49, pgs. 6 - 317).

Noriega's testimony, on direct examination, dealt primarily with the two fires charged in Counts 7, 8, 11, 12 and 13. As to Counts 7 and 8, Noriega testified that in November, 1973 Petitioner Macaluso contacted Noriega and advised him that defendant Rodriguez wanted to talk to Noriega about having two buildings owned by Rodriguez burned (vol. 50, pg. 46). Noriega further testified that he met with Rodriguez on that same day and engaged in a conversation with defendant Rodriguez in which Macaluso was present, where Noriega and defendant Rodriguez discussed the fact that Rodriguez wanted Noriega to burn the premises and Noriega said he would do it. (Id., pg. 46). After viewing the property with defendant Rodriguez, Noriega agreed "that we would burn it for him". Noriega testified that since Macaluso had been present at the conversation, he and defendant Guarino were going to have to take "him along." (Id., pg. 47); that December, 1973, Noriega burned the property in the rear, while defendant Guarino and Petitioner Macaluso attepted to set fire to the front property which resulted in very little damage. (Id., pgs. 48, 49). Noriega stated that defendant Carter

adjusted the fire for the sum of $500.00 (Id., pg. 50). Noriega related that he received $600.00, representing a partial payment, due to the unsuccessful burning of the front property by defendant Guarino and Petitioner Macaluso, and that he, Noriega, in turn paid Macaluso $150.00 (Id., pgs. 51, 52).

Noriega's testimony regarding the property at 3006 North Nebraska Avenue, Tampa, as charged in Counts 11, 12 and 13 of the indictment was more extensive. Noriega testified that about October, 1973, defendant Guarino advised Noriega that the Nebraska property was in need of repairs and could be purchased cheaply, and gave Noriega a slip of paper with the name and phone number of the owner of the property. Noriega related that he called the owner and ascertained that she would sell the property for the sum of $6,000.00. After entering into a sales agreement and giving a $500.00 down payment, Noriega and defendant Guarino met with the defendant Martino to finance the purchase of the property by obtaining a loan through Martino in the sum of $7,000.00, with an alleged kick back of $1,500.00 to Martino for obtaining the loan. The property was placed in the name of Noriega and his wife because no properties in Noriega's name had every been burned. (Id., pgs. 61 - 66).

Noriega went on to relate that he obtained a second loan in the sum of $1,500.00 from Martino's loan company, Ybor Loan Company for the purpose of making repairs on the property, and that he and defendant Guarino, in fact, did make repairs to the property. It was understood between Noriega, Guarino and Martino that the loan would be repaid after the property was repaired, the insurance purchased and the property burned. (Id., pgs. 73 - 75).

Noriega stated that in November 1973 Macaluso offered to purchase the property, and advised Noriega that defendant Morgado would finance Petitioner Macaluso's purchase. Noriega stated that he and Petitioner Macaluso met with defendant Morgado for the purpose of reaching an agreement as to the purchase price, wherein the property could be insured and defendant Morgado could gain

from buying and burning the property. It was agreed that Noriega would sell the property for $14,000.00 to Macaluso, who would obtain a loan from defendant Morgado in the sum of $6,000.00 as a down payment. (Id., pgs. 75 - 78).

In November, 1973 Noriega and his wife executed a deed to Petitioner Macaluso transferring ownership to the Nebraska property. Prior to the transfer of the property, Noriega stated that he met with defendant Martino and advised him that he had found "a person that was interested in buying the property," that he, Noriega could make a substantial profit, and that he, Noriega, could get his money right then and there instead of waiting until he burned the property and received insurance proceeds, to which defendant Martino agreed. (Id., pgs. 79 - 82).

Noriega testified that Morgado gave a check to appellant Macaluso in the sum of $6,000.00, which Macaluso cashed and gave to Noriega. Noriega in turn, testified that he paid off the second mortgage in the sum of $1,500.00 to Ybor Loan Company, and gave $1,800.00 to defendant Guarino as his part. (Id., pgs. 82 - 84). Noriega went on to state that a few days after appellant Macaluso had purchased the property, he, Noriega met with defendant Carter, at Carter's office, and advised Carter that the property had been bought by defendant Morgado in Macaluso's name. Carter advised Noriega to purchase insurance for the property from Bussey Insurance Agency. Noriega then drove Macaluso to the insurance company to acquire fire insurance coverage on the Nebraska property, instructing Macaluso, "strictly to go in there and ask for an insurance policy for $20,000.00 on the building itself and $10,000.00 on the contents". (Id., pgs. 85 - 87).

In February, 1974, Noriega related that he, assisted by defendant Guarino, defendant Gomez and an unnamed person burned the property at 3006 North Nebraska. According to Noriega, Gomez' function in connection with that fire was to monitor radio calls and warn Noriega if there was something suspicious. In addition, Noriega stated that Gomez assured him no one from Gomez' office was involved in a stake out on the property.

Noriega stated that Macaluso knew the property was going to be burned because Noriega and others had put Macaluso in a hospital so that Macaluso would have an excuse for his whereabouts at the time of the fire. (Id., pgs. 88 - 92).

Noriega further testified that Carter adjusted the fire, and personally delivered two insurance checks to Noriega at Carter's office: one check in the sum of $20,000.00, and the other in the sum of $3,000.00. Noriega then took the checks to defendant Morgado and Petitioner Macaluso and advised Morgado that he had the checks because Carter wanted to make sure that he, Carter, received his $3,000.00 for his role in the scheme and that he, Carter, was holding Noriega responsible for his payment. Noriega, Morgado and Petitioner Macaluso then took the drafts to defendant Martino, and from there all four went to the bank to cash them. Noriega related that he received from defendant Morgado $2,000.00 for burning the property and $3,000.00 to deliver to Carter. Noriega stated that he, Petitioner Macaluso and defendant Morgado went directly to Carter's office, where they parked across the street. Carter came out of the building and he and Noriega went into the men's room of the building across the street from where the car was parked, and at that time Noriega paid Carter $3,000.00 (Id., pgs. 93 - 98).

On cross-examination Noriega specifically testified that Petitioner Macaluso did not obtain any interest in the properties located at 1202 East Buffalo Avenue, 3401 - 24th Street, 1811 Taliaferro Street, 20410 Old Cutler Road in Miami, 2917 1/2 20th Avenue, 2114 - 27th Street, 409 East Oak Street, 4509 West Alva Street, 2701 South MacDill Avenue, 316 East Park Avenue, 4601 West Kennedy Boulevard, 3012 Highland Avenue, 8909 North Florida Avenue, and 1907 - 1915 North Armenia Avenue (vol. 52, pgs. 566 - 569). Noriega further testified that Petitioner did not participate in the burning of those properties, nor did Petitioner receive any proceeds from any insurance policies with regard to those properties, and that Petitioner did not participate in any

plan to obtain the proceeds from insurance on those properties (Id., pgs. 569 - 571). In addition, Noriega testified that Petitioner Macaluso had no financial interest nor participated in the burning of the property located at 3310 Vasconia Avenue (Id., pg. 572). Finally, Noriega admitted that Petitioner Macaluso, "had gone to the hospital regularly" (Id., pgs. 572 - 573).

The second witness produced by the government to testify as to the involvement of Petitioner Macaluso was another co-defendant, Joseph Carter. Carter testified that he had been an insurance adjuster for twenty years, specializing in major fire claims (vol. 56, pgs. 4 - 6). During the course of his testimony, Carter indicated that he had personal contact of varying degrees with fifteen of the defendants, and that he adjusted eight of twenty-one fires alleged in the indictment (Id., pgs. 6 - 118). For his services as an adjuster Carter testified he received up to $3,000.00 (Id., pgs. 89 - 107).

Carter related that in processing claims on buildings burned by certain defendants, he would routinely lie to insurance companies by reporting to them that the fires were by "unknown origin", full well knowing who burned the properties (vol. 64, pg. 164). In addition, Carter stated that in handling claims for the defendants, he would frequently tell them what insurance companies to go to and how much insurance to apply for (vol. 56, pg. 22). Carter's testimony began on November 28, 1977 and ended on December 1, 1977 (vol. 56 - 59).

Carter's testimony as to Petitioner Macaluso's involvement dealt strictly with the fire located at 3006 North Nebraska as charged under Counts 11, 12 and 13 of the indictment. Although Carter adjusted the fire at 2208 10th Street and 923 12th Avenue as alleged in Counts 7 and 8 of the indictment, he never testified as to Macaluso's involvement (vol. 56, pgs. 7 - 20).

Carter testified that he adjusted the claim arising out of the fire of February 11, 1974 at 3006 North Nebraska (Id., pg. 20). Carter related that in mid November, 1973 defendant Morgado called him at his office for an appointment, and he met with her

shortly thereafter at which time she advised him that she was having problems procuring insurance on a piece of property in which she had an interest and he referred her to a Joe Palermo at Bussey Insurance Agency. He went on to state that about ten days to two weeks later, defendants Morgado and Noriega met with Carter in his office, at which time they advised Carter they had a particular property they wanted insured, however, they did not mention to Carter the purpose for purchasing insurance. Following the meeting, Carter walked Noriega and defendant Morgado back to their automobile, at which time he noticed Petitioner Macaluso was sitting in the back seat of the car (Id., pgs. 21 - 24).

Carter next met with Noriega at a shopping center parking lot to discuss the 3006 North Nebraska property and another property. The primary discussion between Noriega and Carter at that time was a second property which Noriega intended on purchasing for the purpose of insuring and burning down. (Id., pg. 24).

In the later part of January, 1974 Carter related that he received a phone call from defendant Morgado who wanted a meeting, and Carter arranged for a meeting with Morgado, Noriega and Petitioner Macaluso at a shopping center parking lot. During the meeting, defendant Morgado produced an insurance policy from her purse and requested Carter to review the policy and make recommendations in the hopes of procuring additional insurance on the building. Carter advised that the property appeared to be over insured and should not carry any additional coverage. Morgado advised Carter that they wanted to get all the insurance they could on the property in order to burn it down. (Id., pgs. 26, 27).

Carter related that he received the adjusting assignment following the fire at 3006 North Nebraska and determined that although the damage to the property was extensive, and although it would not be practical to repair the building due to its dilapidated condition, it still did not render the property a total loss per se as reflected on the face of the policy. (Id., pg. 28).

Carter stated that a week to ten days following the fire, he met with defendant Morgado at the shopping center parking lot to discuss the damages, at which time he advised Morgado he could not justify going along with paying a total loss claim. A second meeting was had between Carter, Noriega, Morgado and Petitioner Macaluso approximately two to three days later to discuss the damages and Carter's fee for handling the adjustment. During this meeting, Petitioner Macaluso was instructed by Carter to come to Carter's office in order that Carter could obtain all the necessary information from Macaluso with which to document the file and get it ready to submit to the company with a recommendation for payment. (Id., pgs. 28 - 30).

According to Carter, when Macaluso came to this office, Carter proceeded to take a recorded statement of loss from Macaluso, prior to which Carter instructed Macaluso to follow Carter's directions including the answers that he was to state in response to the questions given. He testified that he, Carter, prepared an original statement of loss and property adjuster's report and mailed the same to Sentry Indemnity Insurance Company. Additionally, Carter testified that he prepared a property adjuster's advanced final report together with a sworn statement of proof of loss signed by Macaluso and that he mailed the same to Sentry Indemnity. (Id., pgs. 30 - 33).

Subsequently, Carter received two drafts, one in the sum of $20,000.00 and one for $3,000.00 which were mailed to Carter at Crawford & Company Insurance Adjusting Firm, where Carter was then employed. Upon receipt of the settlement checks, Carter telephoned Noriega and personally delivered them to Noriega in the parking lot at the rear of Carter's office building. (Id., pgs. 33 - 35).

Approximately one week to ten days after he had given the checks to Noriega, Carter testified that he met Noriega in the parking area at the rear of Carter's office, at which time Morgado and Macaluso were sitting in a car with Noriega. Carter related that he and Noriega left Morgado and Petitioner Macaluso

and went across the street to an adjacent building, entered the men's room, and at that time Noriega handed an envelope to Carter stating that it contained $3,000.00 (Id., pg. 35).

Carter testified that he had been advised by Noriega that defendant Martino had financed the purchase of 3006 Nebraska. (Id., pgs. 35, 36). Carter testified that he again met with defendant Morgado at which time defendant Morgado advised Carter that Fire Marshal Gomez had acted as a look out during the fire at Nebraska Avenue, that in addition, Gomez had given a walkie talkie to the arsonist, in order that he could advise them when to enter and leave the building. (Id., pgs. 36, 37). Following his meeting with Morgado, Carter met with Gomez approximately four to five weeks following the fire at 3006 Nebraska, at which time Carter advised Gomez that he had acted in a very stupid manner in giving a walkie talkie to Noriega, since this was a piece of fire equipment. Carter stated that Gomez replied, "Yeah, I think that was kind of stupid." Gomez further stated to Carter that he had removed a pair of doors from the Nebraska property after the fire and taken them to his home. (Id., pgs. 39 - 41).

In addition to the direct evidence received from Carter and Noriega, the government produced two witnesses to testify regarding the mailings involved in Counts 7 and 8 of the indictment. Michael F. McNamara, the claims examiner for the Jefferson Insurance Company in New York City, testified that Jefferson Insurance Company was the insurer for the fire loss incurred at 2008 10th Street and 923 1/2 12th Avenue, the property of defendant Rodriguez. He further testified that Government's Exhibits 10 - A and 10 - B were initially prepared in Jacksonville, Florida by their general agents, Shelly, Middlebrooks and O'Leary. (vol. 1, 3rd supp., pgs. 1 - 11).

In addition, the government called Patrick O'Leary, an underwriter for Shelly, Middlebrooks and O'Leary in Jacksonville, Florida, who were general agents for the Jefferson Insurance Company. Mr. O'Leary testified that he had been employed by

Shelly, Middlebrooks and O'Leary since December, 1975. He further testified that Government's Exhibits 10 - A and 10 - B were executed in their office in Jacksonville, Florida and subsequently forwarded to their producing agent in Tampa by mail. (vol. 1, 3rd supp., pgs. 1 - 5).

BASIS FOR FEDERAL JURISDICTION

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida was the court of first impression. Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3231:

§3231. District courts

The district courts of the United States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United States.

Nothing in this title shall be held to take away or impair the jurisdiction of the courts of the several States under the laws thereof.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

Pursuant to Rule 17 of the Rules of the Supreme Court, a writ of certiorari should be granted to review the decision in United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981). The decision in this case conflicts with the decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750 (1945) on the issue of severance in a criminal trial involving one or more conspiracies. The appellate court has also sanctioned a departure from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings in the trial court.

The argument in Point II involves the constitutionality of the RICO Statute, an issue which has been decided by the appellate court but should be settled by this court.

ARGUMENT

I.

WHETHER AS A MATTER OF LAW THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND RULES 8 AND 14 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE WERE VIOLATED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT MACALUSO'S MOTIONS FOR SEVERANCE.

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees that no person shall be "deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." Every defendant including those accused of conspiracy is entitled to a fair trial in which the "potential for transference of guilt be minimized to the extent possible under the circumstances in order 'to individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass.'" U.S. v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 905 (5th Cir. 1978), citing Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. at 773, 66 S.Ct. at 1252. Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure lend some concreteness to the issue of when multiple defendants may be joined without offending the principles of due process. Rule 8(b) states:

> (b) Joinder of Defendants. Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.

Even if the defendants are properly joined, the court may, in its discretion, grant a severance of defendants if it appears that a joint trial may be prejudicial.

> Rule 14. Relief from Prejudicial Joinder
> If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by such joinder for trial together, the court may order an election or separate trials of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial.

On a Rule 14 motion to sever, the trial judge must balance the inherent prejudice to the defendants against the need for

judicial economy. U. S. v. McLauren, 557 F.2d 1064, 1074 (5th Cir. 1977). In doing so, the trial court must grant severance if it appears that promoting judicial economy will result in an unfair trial.

> A single joint trial, however desirable from the point of view of efficient and expeditious criminal adjudication, may not be had at the expense of a defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial. U.S. v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 896 (7th Cir. 1965).

In determining whether a fair trial is possible, a court should look at:

> Whether under all the circumstances of the particular case, as a practical matter, it is within the capacity of the jurors to follow the court's admonitory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise the independent evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts, statements and conduct. In sum, can the jury keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him? If so, though the task be difficult, severance should not be granted. Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1965).

This case involved a massive confusing and complex trial which by its very nature made it impossible for a jury to individualize guilt and clearly understand the evidence and charges. There were twenty defendants, most with Spanish or Italian surnames; 35 counts, 69 acts and 56 predicate acts of racketeering activity; 21 separate acts of arson; a trial record of 100 volumes; 200 witnesses and several hundred exhibits in a trial lasting over 3 months; 19 defense attorneys and 3 prosecuting attorneys. The atmosphere was that of a 3-ring circus with so many defendants, attorneys and exhibits crowded into one courtroom. Each of the defendants was involved in a different combination of acts. Some of government's witnesses testified against a few of the defendants while others testified against many.

The inherent danger of prejudice in a mass trial is exemplified in this case by the statement of counsel for co-defendant Lostracco, who, in his opening statement, referred to the defendants as a "bunch of gangsters." Indeed, if one could

envision the courtroom scene with the massive numbers of people sitting at the defense tables and the general circus atmosphere, such a statement had to have tainted the outlook of the jurors and caused prejudice throughout the trial.

The appellate court looked at the verdicts to resolve the question of whether the jury was able to individualize its decisions. Martino, 648 F.2d at 386. While it is true that some defendants were acquitted on some counts, it is purely speculative to assume that this in itself shows that the jury understood the evidence as it applied to each defendant and each count. In fact, the convictions of defendant Macaluso on counts 11, 12 and 13 are inconsistent with that conclusion.

Counts 11, 12 and 13 of the indictment charged defendants Macaluso, Martino, Carter, Morgado, Guarino and Noriega with mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1341 as a result of an alleged agreement to burn the premises at 3006 North Nebraska Avenue, in order to fraudulently obtain money from Sentry Indemnity Insurance Company pursuant to fire insurance coverage. Defendants Carter and Noriega pled guilty and testified against Macaluso, Martino, Morgado and Guarino. Only Macaluso was convicted, despite testimony that Martino and Guarino arranged financing for the property and Morgado was active in obtaining the fire insurance from Carter. Macaluso's conviction on these counts is illogical in view of the acquittal of his co-defendants and is a result of speculation, conjecture, an unreasonable transfer of guilt, or the failure of the jury to consider fairly the evidence adduced at trial individually and personally with regard to Macaluso.

When Congress enacted RICO, it created a legal fiction called the "enterprise" to allow mass trials of defendants involved in several conspiracies. U.S. v. Elliot, 571 F.2d 880, 902 (5th Cir. 1978). However, it did not discard the requirement that a "common objective" be present before a mass trial may be justified. Elliot at 902-903. Each RICO defendant must join in

the common objective of conducting the affairs of the enterprise and must have engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.

In this case, it is submitted that the proof at trial showed multiple conspiracies, and, in fact, multiple enterprises with one person in common, Willie Noriega. Defendant Macaluso was involved in two out of a total of 21 criminal transactions. Under the RICO statute he could have been charged with being part of a conspiracy or enterprise limited to those two instances, rather than being included in a massive "enterprise" which he had no knowledge. Prejudicial joinder could have been avoided in that fashion.

The issue here is whether by treating multiple conspiracies as an overall "enterprise" the courts can avoid the joint trial principles of Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 U.S. 750 (1945). In Martino, the appellate court stated:

> Finally, appellants cite Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), attacking the indictment on the ground that it alleges only one conspiracy while the government's evidence esablishes multiple conspiracies. They contend that this results in a variance that substantially prejudiced their rights contrary to Kotteakos. We disagree. This argument has been considered in Elliott, Dieudue, and Bright, supra, and in United States v. L'Hoste, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S. , 101 S.Ct. 104, 66 L.Ed.2d 39 (1980). In L'Hoste we resolved this issue adverse to the appellants, stating: "If the Government proves multiple conspiracies and a defendant's involvement in at least one of them, then clearly there is no variance affecting that defendant's substantial rights." 609 F.2d at 801, citing United States v. Wayman, 510 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 846, 96 S.Ct. 84, 46 L.Ed.2d 67 (1975). Following the path of L'Hoste, we find no variance affecting the appellants' substantial rights. 648 F.2d at 382.

In this case, the court should have followed Kotteakos and granted severance. The facts in Martino and Kotteakos are similar. In Kotteakos, 32 defendants were indicted for conspiracy to violate the National Housing Act. Nineteen were tried but only thirteen got to the jury, of whom seven were found guilty. In that case, the common and key figure was Simon Brown, who acted as a broker in obtaining home improvement loans for a 5% commission. The FHA loans were obtained by submitting applications

with false information. Defendant Lekacos secured 2 loans through Brown and shared in the proceeds of another. He also acted as a go-between on one occasion for Kotteakos and Brown. Kotteakos and Regenbogen were involved in obtaining several loans through Brown. The other defendants were involved in separate loans through Brown but had no relationship with their co-defendants.

The appellate court held that several conspiracies were proven not just one, but the joint trial was not prejudicial error requiring reversal. Kotteakos v. U.S., 151 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1945). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that joinder of defendants under this set of facts was prejudicial. The court distinguished Berger v. U.S., 295 U.S. 78, 79 L.Ed. 1314, 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935) in which the court held it was harmless error to join four defendants from 2 conspiracies.

> On the face of things it is one thing to hold harmless the admission of evidence which took place in the Berger Case, where only two conspiracies involving four persons all told were proved, and an entirely different things to apply the same rule where, as here, only one conspiracy was charged, but eight separate ones were proved, involving at the outset thirty-two defendants. The essential difference is not overcome by the fact that the thirty-two were reduced, by severance, dismissal or pleas of guilty to nineteen when the trial began and to thirteen by the time the cases went to the jury. The sheer difference in numbers, both of defendants and of conspiracies proven, distinguishes the situation. Obviously the burden of defense to a defendant, connected with one or a few of so many distinct transactions, is vastly different not only in preparation for trial, but also in looking out for the securing safeguard against evidence affecting the defendants to prevent its transference as "harmless error" or by psychological effect in spite of instructions for keeping separate transactions separate. Kotteakos, 328 U. S. at 766-67.

In Kotteakos, the government argued that there was no prejudice because the results showed the jury was able to exercise discrimination among the defendants by acquitting some and finding others guilty. The same argument was advanced in Martino. However, the Supreme Court in Kotteakos rejected that argument, stating that "error permeated the entire charge, indeed

the entire trial." The court refused to speculate on the reasoning of the jury. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 769.

The Supreme Court in Kotteakos commented on the single versus multiple conspiracy problem.

> The trial court was of the view that one conspiracy was made out by showing that each defendant was linked to Brown in one or more transactions and that it was possible on the evidence for the jury to conclude that all were in a common adventure because of this fact and the similarity of purpose presented in the various applications for loans.
>
> This view, specifically embodied throughout the instructions, obviously confuses the common purpose of a single enterprise with the several, though similar, purposes of numerous separate adventures of like character. 328 U. S. at 768-69.

In Martino, like Kotteakos, there was one key person, Willie Noriega, who masterminded a series of similar fires and insurance claims. Macaluso was alleged to be involved in two out of twenty-one arsons. Other defendants were involved in other unrelated fires. Martino like Kotteakos should be characterized as "numerous separate adventures of like character" and not as a "single enterprise" Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 769.

Another important concern is the number of defendants being tried together. Kotteakos involved 19, Martino 20.

> Numbers are vitally important in trial, especially in criminal matters. Guilt with us remains individual and personal, even as respects conspiracies. It is not a matter of mass application. There are times when of necessity, because of the nature and scope of the particular federation, large numbers of persons taking part must be tried together or perhaps not at all, at any rate as respects some. When many conspire, they invite mass trial by their conduct. Even so, the proceedings are exceptional to our tradition and call for use of every safeguard to individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass. Wholly different is it with those who join together with only a few, though many others may be doing the same and though some of them may line up with more than one group.
>
> Criminal they may be, but it is not the criminality of mass conspiracy. They do not invite mass trial by their conduct. Nor does our system tolerate it. That way lies the drift toward totalitarian institutions. True, this may be inconvenient for prosecution. But our Government is not one of mere convenience or efficiency. It too has a stake, with every

> citizen in his being afforded our historic invididual protections, including those surrounding criminal trials. About them we dare not become careless or complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth.
>
> Here toleration went too far. We do not think that either Congress...or this Court, when deciding the Berger Case, intended to authorize the Government to string together, for common trial, eight or more separate and distinct crimes, conspiracies related in kind though they might be, when the only nexus among them lies in the fact that one man participated in all. Leeway there must be for such cases as the Berger situation and for others where proof may not accord with exact specifications in indictments. Otherwise criminal conspirators never could be brought to halt. But if the practice here followed were to stand, we see nothing to prevent its extension to a dozen, a score, or more conspiracies and at the same time to scores of men involved, if at all, only separately in them. The dangers of transference of guilt from one to another across the line separating conspiracies, subconsciously or otherwise, are so great that no one really can say prejudice to substantial right has not taken place...The line must be drawn somewhere. Whether or not Berger marks the limit for this sort of error and case, we are clear that it must lie somewhere between that case and this one.
>
> We have not rested our decision particularly on the fact that the offense charged, and those proved, were conspiracies. That offense is perhaps not greatly different from others when the scheme charged is tight and the number involved small. But as it is broadened to include more and more, in varying degrees of attachment to the confederation, the possibilities for miscarriage of justice to particular individuals become greater and greater...At the outskirts they are perhaps higher than in any other form of criminal trial our system affords. The greater looseness generally allowed for specifying the offense and its details, for receiving proof, and generally in the conduct of the trial, becomes magnified as the numbers involved increase. Kotteakos v. U.S., 328 US at 772-776. See also United States v. Central Supply Ass'n, 6 F.R.D. 526 (N.D. Ohio 1947)

It is clear that the Martino defendants were denied a fair trial due to the prejudicial joinder of people participating in "separate adventures of like character" rather than one large conspiracy with a common objective.

II.

THE RICO STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE AS WRITTEN AND APPLIED.

The RICO statute violates due process because it is unconstitutionally vague as written. The concept of a criminal "enterprise", 18 U.S.C. §1961(4) which is incorporated into the

substantive provisions of 18 U.S.C. §1962, is elusive. A person of average intelligence would not understand the nature of the conduct which violates the statute. U.S. v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976). As applied by the Courts, an "enterprise" may mean one or several conspiracies. It would be impossible for a defendant to know that by participating in one or two arsons with a few other defendants, he would be violating a racketeering statute that would make him liable as part of an "enterprise" of 23 defendants involved in 21 fires.

The RICO statute is applied in an arbitrary fashion because the concept of a criminal "enterprise" may be one large conspiracy or several smaller ones. In this case, Macaluso could have been charged with a violation of RICO for the two fires he was allegedly involved in as part of a smaller enterprise. Instead, he was grouped with 19 other defendants and 21 arsons as part of a larger enterprise, of which he had no knowledge. For these reasons, RICO is unconstitutional.

The conspiracy section of RICO, 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) is unconstitutionally vague as written and applied. It states:

> (d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

Each of the subsections requires participation in an "enterprise". It has recently been decided, that an "enterprise" may be an illegal one, as it was in this case. U.S. v. Turkette, _____U.S._____, 101 S.Ct. 2524 (1981). An illegal enterprise is nothing more than a conspiracy or group of conspiracies. Therefore, subsection (d) makes it unlawful to conspire to join a conspiracy (enterprise) which engages in a pattern of racketeering activity. How can a person of average intelligence understand that 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) makes it unlawful to conspire to conspire, and know what conduct is prohibited? It is submitted that the count I conviction of defendant Macaluso for violating 18 U.S.C. §1962(d) must be reversed because that portion of the statute is unconstitutionally vague as written and applied.

III.

ADOPTION OF CO-DEFENDANTS' ARGUMENTS

Petitioner Macaluso, by virtue of the limiting requirements for petitions has specifically omitted other arguments which he is aware of and are being raised by his co-defendants. He does not wish to waive his rights to the benefit of those arguments, and therefore, specifically adopts each and every issue raised and argued by his co-defendants where the same are applicable to his case.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Joseph Macaluso respectfully requests that this court grant his Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

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Appendix

to the nature of a pledge and to the apparent purpose of the recordation requirement.

The essential prerequisite for any common law pledge is *possession*, for it is the creditor's actual or constructive possession of the collateral which provides notice to the world of the creditor's security interest. Possession is in practice an *alternative* to public recordation of a security interest; a lien based on possession need not also be recorded. *See* 4B *Collier on Bankruptcy* ¶ 70.86 (1978). Thus, the Uniform Commercial Code explicitly excludes from its filing requirement any security interest perfected by the secured party's possession of the collateral; as the Official Comments to the Code note, this rule follows the practice "at common law, [where] there is no requirement of filing when the secured party has possession of the collateral in a pledge transaction." Tex.Bus. & Comm.Code Ann. § 9.302(a)(1) and Comment 2 (Vernon 1968).

We do not think that the Texas legislature intended to change the ancient concept of the common law pledge by its article 1.07(1)(c) requirement of recordation for all liens "provided for by Title 122A." Prior to the addition of article 1.07(1)(c) to the Texas Taxation-General statutes in 1969, state tax liens on personal property were accorded priority over all other liens whether or not the state recorded the tax lien. This created a tremendous hardship for those creditors who in good faith relied on the public records as evidence of their priority. *See State of Texas v. Wynne*, 134 Tex. 455, 133 S.W.2d 951 (1939), *appeal dismissed*, 310 U.S. 610, 60 S.Ct. 980, 84 L.Ed. 1388 (1940); *Allied Finance Co. v. State of Texas*, 387 S.W.2d 435 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1965, writ ref'd n. r. e.). Although neither party has cited any published legislative history of article 1.07(1)(c), we think it obvious that that article was intended to alleviate the hardship caused by unrecorded state tax liens. No such hardship would be caused where notice to the world follows from the state's possession of the collateral, and therefore the purpose of article 1.07(1)(c) would not be furthered by the recordation of a common law pledge. Finally, we note that article 20.021(N) was enacted in 1978, several years *after* the passage of article 1.07(1)(c).

We conclude that article 1.07(1)(c) cannot reasonably be read to require recordation of a common law pledge granted to the state pursuant to the requirement of article 20.-021(N). We reverse the judgment of the bankruptcy court and remand this case to the bankruptcy court for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Sam C. MARTINO, Joseph C. Russello and Rolando Gonzalez Rodriguez, Defendants-Appellants.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

John Alan HOLT, Rosario Palermo, William H. Brown, a/k/a Bill, John D. Fisher, Robert D. Young, Joseph Macaluso, a/k/a Joe, Frank Scionti, John Nicholas Lostracco, Sam C. Martino, Paul Guarino, Jimmy Farina, Berton B. Chase, a/k/a Bert, Rolando Gonzalez Rodriguez, a/k/a Roland Rodriguez, Joseph D. Lazzara, a/k/a Joe, Joseph C. Russello, a/k/a Joe and Amalia Morgado, Defendants-Appellants.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Sam C. MARTINO, Defendant-Appellant.

Nos. 78-3611, 78-5260 and 79-2606.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

June 19, 1981.

Rehearing Denied in Nos. 78-5260 and 79-2606 Sept. 17, 1981.

Rehearing En Banc Granted in No. 78-3611 Oct. 13, 1981.

Sixteen defendants appealed from a combined total of 80 convictions rendered in

the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, at Tampa, Wm. Terrell Hodges, J., for mail fraud and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act arising out of arson ring. The Court of Appeals, Politz, Circuit Judge, held, inter alia, that: (1) RICO is constitutional; (2) indictment was sufficient, not duplicitous, did not misapply RICO, and there was no variance affecting defendants' substantial rights; (3) prosecution for substantive and conspiracy violations of RICO did not violate double jeopardy clause; (4) there were no *Brady* violations mandating reversal; (5) trial judge was not obligated to ask court-appointed expert to determine government witness' mental capacity at time of alleged offenses; (6) Government did not violate Jencks Act; (7) prosecutor's referring to witness' participation in federal witness protection program was not unfair exploitation; (8) trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling key government witness competent to testify; (9) court properly admitted plea bargain agreement of government's key witness; (10) witness' reference to his willingness to take lie detector test was not prejudicial; (11) there was no error in exclusion of testimony of government witness' threats against employer of one defense witness; (12) trial judge correctly charged jury as to evidence required for mail fraud conviction; and (13) evidence was sufficient to support convictions except on two counts of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy to violate RICO and two other RICO counts.

Convictions affirmed in part and reversed in part and denial of motion for new trial affirmed.

1. Commerce ⇐82.5
Constitutional Law ⇐91

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not unconstitutionally punish associational status. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 1.

2. Commerce ⇐82.5

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is not unconstitutionally vague. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

3. Constitutional Law ⇐197

Not every judicial expansion of statutory construction creates an ex post facto law; rather, only statutory construction which is unexpected and indefensible by reference to law which has been expressed prior to conduct in issue creates ex post facto law. U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.

4. Constitutional Law ⇐199

Interpretation given to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act by Court of Appeals had not so deviated from what would be an average person's understanding that an ex post facto effect had occurred. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; U.S.C.A.Const. Art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.

5. Commerce ⇐82.5
Constitutional Law ⇐82(6)
States ⇐4.17

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not violate Ninth and Tenth Amendments by intruding upon state sovereignty, since RICO proscribes furthering of the enterprise, not the predicate acts, and predicate acts are, in turn, proscribed by existing, enumerated state or federal laws. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 9, 10.

6. Indictment and Information ⇐110(3)

Indictment charging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act sufficiently alleged required effect of interstate commerce by tracking language of the statute as to effect on interstate commerce and by further alleging that defendants "did knowingly and willfully place and cause to be placed * * * in authorized depositories for mail matter to be sent and delivered according to the

directions thereon by the Postal Service of the United States." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

7. Indictment and Information ⇐125(4)

Count of information charging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act involving arson ring was not duplicitous; but rather charged single conspiracy involving several fires committed as part of conspiracy. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

8. Arson ⇐15

Section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act making it unlawful for one associated with or employed by enterprise to participate in conduct of its affairs through pattern of racketeering did not apply only to those who managed arson ring. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c).

9. Conspiracy ⇐43(12)

There was no variance affecting defendants' substantial rights where indictment alleged only one conspiracy while government's evidence established multiple conspiracies.

10. Criminal Law ⇐195(1)

Under "same offense" test of double jeopardy, if there is any difference in elements to be proven, two instances are not the same offense. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

11. Criminal Law ⇐196

Overlap in evidence in prosecution of substantive and conspiracy charges under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not occasion automatic invocation of double jeopardy. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

12. Conspiracy ⇐24

Conspiracy charge under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act requires that defendant have objectively manifested agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in affairs of an enterprise through commission of two or more predicate crimes. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

13. Criminal Law ⇐200(6)

Prosecution for substantive and conspiracy violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act did not violate double jeopardy clause, since two counts did not charge same offense, despite considerable overlap in the evidence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

14. Indictment and Information ⇐121.-1(3)

Action on motion for bill of particulars is committed to sound discretion of trial judge.

15. Criminal Law ⇐1149

Court of Appeals may reverse ruling for denying bill of particulars only if defendant demonstrates that he was actually surprised at the trial and thus incurred prejudice to his substantial rights by the denial.

16. Indictment and Information ⇐121.-1(3)

Despite contention that bill of particulars should have been granted to prevent confusion which hindered defendants from understanding nature of charges against them, trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying motion, absent demonstration that defendants were actually surprised at trial and thus incurred prejudice to their substantial rights.

17. Criminal Law ⇐700

Impeachment evidence, as well as evidence favorable to the accused in the issue of guilt, falls within disclosure requirements of *Brady* rule.

18. Criminal Law ⇐1171.1(1)

Failure of government to disclose information useful only for impeachment mandates reversal only if defendants demonstrate that undisclosed evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal.

19. Criminal Law ⇐1171.1(1)

In prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act involving more than 100 government witnesses, although prior inconsistent statement of one government witness fell within disclosure requirements of *Brady*, failure of government to disclose information did not mandate reversal, since it could not be seriously contended that witness' statement would probably have resulted in acquittal. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

20. Criminal Law ⇐1171.1(1)

Any *Brady* violation concerning letter written to United States Attorney by psychiatrist who served as government's witness on rebuttal was expunged by disclosure of letter after doctor testified, consistent with requirements of Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500.

21. Criminal Law ⇐627.6(1)

When alleged *Brady* material is contained in Jencks Act material, disclosure is generally timely if government complies with Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500.

22. Criminal Law ⇐742(1)
Witnesses ⇐79(1)

Whether witness is competent to testify is special question of law to be answered by judge; it is left to jury to assess witness' credibility and weight to be accorded his testimony.

23. Witnesses ⇐41

Because witness' mental state during period about which he proposes to testify is matter which affects his credibility, it is a jury determination and thus not germane to competency to testify.

24. Witnesses ⇐77

Having exercised its discretion and appointed expert to conduct competency examination of key government witness pursuant to defense request prior to trial, trial judge was not obligated to ask expert to determine witness' mental capacity at time of alleged offenses as well as his competence to testify, although it would not have been error had trial judge done so.

25. Criminal Law ⇐622(1)

On motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure which permits severance if defendant is prejudiced by joinder, trial judge is required to weigh prejudice inherent in joint trial in light of realities of judicial economy and to sever defendants as needs of justice dictate. Fed.Rules Cr.Proc. Rule 14, 18 U.S.C.A.

26. Criminal Law ⇐1148

Denial of motion to sever is reversible only for abuse of discretion. Fed.Rules Cr. Proc. Rule 14, 18 U.S.C.A.

27. Criminal Law ⇐622(1)

General test on severance motion is whether under all circumstances of particular case, as a practical matter, it is within capacity of jurors to follow court's admonitory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise independent evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts, statements and conduct. Fed. Rules Cr.Proc. Rule 14, 18 U.S.C.A.

28. Criminal Law ⇐622(1)

Constitution does not guarantee trial free from burdens that inevitably accompany joint trial involving numerous defendants and multiple charges; rather, it requires that potential for transferability of guilt be minimized to extent possible in order to individualize each defendant in relation to the mass.

29. Criminal Law ⇐622(2)

In prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act involving 20 defendants, 35 counts, and which lasted three months during which time jury heard over 200 witnesses, trial judge did not abuse his discretion in failing to grant repeated motions for severance, where trial judge minimized potential transfers of guilt with every tool at his command, and it was

31. Criminal Law ⇐627.7(3)

Notes taken by interviewer during interview with witness do not qualify as a "statement" under Jencks Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500.

32. Criminal Law ⇐627.7(3)

Despite contention that government purposely failed to record interviews with potential witnesses to avoid producing Jencks Act material, there was no requirement that interviews be recorded or that interview notes be reduced to writing and signed or otherwise approved by witness, and it could not be presumed that prosecutor acted in bad faith by failing to reduce his notes to statement form. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500.

33. Criminal Law ⇐703

Prosecutor's brief comment at beginning of trial referring to witness' participation in federal witness protection program was not an unfair exploitation, in anticipation that witness' receipt of benefits from government would be used to impeach his credibility.

34. Criminal Law ⇐919(3)

Various comments made by prosecutor during closing argument, including remarks about "defense lawyer tactics," the "millionaire defense," the individual victims of the arsons, and his response to one defendant's argument by saying "government's evidence has been truthful," did not meet test for new trial.

35. Criminal Law ⇐1171.1(3)

Comment by one defendant's counsel that his client was entirely innocent of charges brought against him and was forced as a result of indictment to sit down with a "bunch of gangsters" was not so prejudicial against other defendants as to mandate reversals.

36. Criminal Law ⇐721(3)

One defense counsel's comment on his client's decision to testify was not an improper reference to other defendants' decisions not to testify.

37. Witnesses ⇐309

Trial court did not err in refusing to strike witness' responses elicited by defendants' questions, even though witness chose to exercise his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, where questions asked were aimed at undermining witness' credibility which had already been subject of intense attack during cross-examination. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 6.

38. Witnesses ⇐198(1)

Defendant's right of cross-examination was not impaired when witness asserted his attorney-client privilege in response to question whether he had asked his attorney to work with United States Attorney on his behalf, where response was given only once during extensive examination and witness was subsequently asked whether he had sought help from United States Attorney and he answered affirmatively. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 6.

39. Criminal Law ⇐1153(2)

Unless abuse of discretion is demonstrated, trial judge's decision on whether witness is competent to testify will not be disturbed.

40. Witnesses ⇐79(1)

In prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling key government witness competent to testify. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

41. Criminal Law ⇐338(7)

Court properly admitted plea bargain agreement of government's key witness, despite references that mentioned need for protection for witness and his family and his promise to testify "truthfully."

42. Criminal Law ⇐396(1)

If defense relies upon existence of plea bargain to attack credibility of witness, it is not then entitled to preclude jury from being apprised of additional matters relevant to bargain so as to leave incorrect inference that witness has made better bargain for himself than in fact he has made.

43. Criminal Law ⇐419(2)

Plea bargain was not introduced to establish truth of factual assertions contained therein; rather, it was introduced to establish fact of its existence and contents, and as such, was not hearsay.

44. Criminal Law ⇐388

Results of polygraph test are inadmissible in evidence.

45. Criminal Law ⇐1169.5(2)

Although witness' reference to his willingness to take lie detector test was improper, it was not prejudicial, in view of fact that trial judge not only cautioned jury twice to disregard comment, but also told them why such an instruction was being given.

46. Criminal Law ⇐721(3)

Prosecutor's comment "if he wants to take the stand he may," was not a reversible error reference to defendants' election not to testify, where prosecutor was more probably referring to defense counsel testifying and statement was not of such character that jury would naturally necessarily take it to be comment on failure of accused to testify.

47. Criminal Law ⇐1168(1)

Various responses given by witnesses during trial which lasted over three months and resulted in record which included more than 1,100 pages of testimony did not measurably affect jury in any way and did not result in prejudice to defendants.

48. Criminal Law ⇐1168(1)

Allegedly improper statements should not be viewed in the abstract; question is what impact they had in context of particular trial in terms of fair reference and quantity of untainted evidence in the case.

49. Criminal Law ⇐417(15)

Declarant's statement which simply indicated that he might have been one to cause fire was not a declaration sufficiently subjecting him to civil liability to invoke exception to hearsay rule for statement against interest. Fed.Rules Evid. Rule 804(b)(3), 28 U.S.C.A.

50. Criminal Law ⇐1168(2)

Before reversal will lie on ground of trial judge's allowing breaks in sequestration, defendants must demonstrate substantial likelihood that some prejudice resulted.

51. Criminal Law ⇐854(2)

Trial judge has discretion to decide whether to disperse jury.

52. Criminal Law ⇐854(2)

Once trial judge chose to sequester jury, it was not error for him to allow breaks in that sequestration by permitting jurors to visit with family members, even though jury was not reinstructed prior to each break about avoiding outside influence, where jury was constantly reminded during course of trial not to discuss case with anyone and to avoid reading any publicity concerning trial and jurors were otherwise made fully aware of their responsibilities.

53. Grand Jury ⇐36.2

Citizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas.

54. Grand Jury ⇐36.2

Prosecutor could call defendant to testify before grand jury, even though prosecutor was advised that defendant intended to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. U.S.C.A.Const. Amend. 5.

55. Grand Jury ⇐34

Defendant was not denied right to unbiased grand jury by prosecutor's comment, in presence of grand jury, that another defendant was a disgrace for exercising his right to remain silent.

56. Criminal Law ⇐338(1)

Trial court did not err in ruling inadmissible testimony of defense witness who was to testify about shooting Government's key witness after government witness threatened defense witness' employer, since, although defendant relied on defense that he acted in response to threats from Government's witness, government witness' threats against employer of defense witness did not relate directly to defendant. Fed. Rules Evid. Rule 608(b), 28 U.S.C.A.

57. Post Office ⇐50

Charge as to evidence required for mail fraud conviction stating "a statement or representation may also be 'false' or 'fraudulent' when it constitutes a half-truth, or effectively conceals a material fact, with intent to defraud," avoided error by inclusion of words "with intent to defraud." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

58. Criminal Law ⇐1159.2(10)

With respect to conspiracy conviction, test on appeal is whether there is a substantial evidence to support verdicts.

59. Commerce ⇐82.5

In prosecution on substantive charge under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, government must prove: existence of enterprise; that enterprise affected interstate commerce, that defendant was employed by or associated with enterprise; that he participated in conduct of affairs of enterprise; and that he participated through pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c).

60. Conspiracy ⇐23

To convict on charge of conspiracy, government must prove that defendant had knowledge of conspiracy and that he intended to join in objectives of conspiracy; degree of criminal intent necessary for participation in conspiracy must be at least equal to that required for substantive offense itself.

61. Conspiracy ⇐28(3)

To convict for conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, government must prove that person objectively manifested, through words or actions, agreement to participate in conduct of affairs of enterprise through commission of two or more predicate crimes. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

62. Post Office ⇐35(2)

If there is sufficient evidence to connect defendant to fraudulent scheme involving use of mails, it is not necessary that he do any of the mailing in order to support conviction for mail fraud. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

63. Conspiracy ⇐40

Coschemers are jointly responsible for each other's acts when acts are within general scope and in furtherance of the scheme.

64. Arson ⇐37(1)
Post Office ⇐49(11)

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of arsonist on two counts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and on four counts of mail fraud arising out of arson ring. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1961 et seq.

65. Criminal Law ⇐1130(2)

Defendant's adopting argument advanced by codefendants in support of issue of sufficiency of evidence and any other issue they raise that may have applied to defendant was not an appropriate challenge to adequacy of evidence.

66. Arson ⇐37(1)
Post Office ⇐49(11)

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions of arsonist on two counts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and on 13 counts of mail fraud arising out of arson ring. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1961 et seq.

67. Conspiracy ⇐47(3)

Evidence was not sufficient to support conspiracy conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, absent proof of agreement to commit two specified predicate crimes; only predicate act enumerated in indictment implicating defendant involved arson. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

68. Arson ⇐37(1)
Conspiracy ⇐47(3)

Evidence reflected more than defendant's mere association with enterprise, and showed that he played important role by assisting in acquisition of properties suitable for burning and was sufficient to support substantive and conspiracy convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq., 1962(c).

69. Post Office ⇐49(11)

Although there was no evidence offered showing that defendant personally mailed proof of loss which was subject of challenged mail fraud convictions, such evidence was not required, and convictions on two counts were supported by evidence that showed that defendant was involved with several other defendants in scheme to defraud insurer through arson of certain property. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

70. Post Office ⇐35(20)

So long as one participant in fraudulent scheme uses mails in execution of fraud, all other knowing participants in scheme are legally liable for that use of the mails. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

71. Post Office ⇐35(20)

Once defendant became involved in scheme to defraud insurer through arson of certain property, she had to do some affirmative act of withdrawal before she could disclaim responsibility for subsequent acts of her coschemers. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

72. Arson ⇐37(1)
Conspiracy ⇐47(3)

Defendant's involvement in arson and mail fraud, and evidence establishing her relationship with arson ring, was sufficient to support conviction on substantive and conspiracy counts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq., 1962(c).

73. Criminal Law ⇐1134(2)

On appeal of convictions resulting from joint trial, Court of Appeals' inquiry is limited to determining whether evidence is sufficient to support counts on which particular defendant was convicted; court does not look at what jury did with other counts or other defendants.

74. Post Office ⇐49(11)

Even though jury acquitted three other defendants on three mail fraud counts, verdicts did not necessarily indicate that jury rejected, as credible witnesses, witnesses who pled guilty to charge and testified, and evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction on same three counts. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

75. Indictment and Information ⇐175

Variance between indictment and evidence as to specific mailing locations involved in count charging mail fraud was a technical variance, and immaterial, considering totality of circumstances, including fact that other information in indictment was correct.

76. Post Office ⇐49(11)

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions on two counts charging mail fraud with respect to arson and subsequent collection of insurance proceeds for certain property. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

77. Arson ⇐37(1)
Conspiracy ⇐47(3)

Evidence that established defendant's active involvement in affairs of arson ring and that showed he intended to further affairs of the enterprise was sufficient to support substantive and conspiracy convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq., 1962(c).

78. Post Office ⇐35(7)

No mail fraud occurred as to claim for insurance proceeds for burning of house, where title had not yet passed to member of arson ring at time it was burned and proceeds were claimed by and paid to owners as to whom there was no evidence of involvement in arson or knowledge of plan to burn building for insurance, or evidence that they submitted claim under their policy intending to deliver over or share insurance payments with any member of arson ring. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

79. Post Office ⇐35(7)

Success of scheme is not required for mail fraud conviction. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

80. Arson ⇐37(1)

Although evidence supported findings that defendant participated in arson and in discussions which could lead to mail fraud, evidence was insufficient to support conviction on substantive count under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,

because he did not commit two predicate acts. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et Seq.

81. Conspiracy ⇐47(5)

Evidence did not support conviction on conspiracy count under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, as charged in indictment, where no mail fraud occurred as to fire loss claim charged in indictment, and mail fraud which was part of plan by defendant and others to commit arson and mail fraud was not charged in the indictment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

82. Criminal Law ⇐564(2)

Venue need only be proven by preponderance of the evidence.

83. Criminal Law ⇐564(3)

As long as there is circumstantial evidence in record supporting inference that crime was committed in district where trial is held, direct evidence is not required to prove venue.

84. Criminal Law ⇐113

Venue for mail fraud prosecution properly lay in Middle District of Florida, based on testimony that original proof of loss had been mailed to Atlanta office by Tampa office adjuster and that it was customary to send proof of loss by mail to Atlanta division office. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 3237(a).

85. Post Office ⇐35(6)

To sustain mail fraud convictions, it was not necessary to prove that defendant actually did the mailing; he need only have had reasonable basis to foresee his actions would result in use of the mails. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

86. Post Office ⇐35(6)

Though one lacks actual intent to use mails, one "causes" mails to be used, as will sustain mail fraud conviction, when he acts with knowledge that mails will be used in ordinary course of business. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

See publication Words and Phrases for other judicial constructions and definitions.

87. Post Office ⇐49(11)

It could be inferred that defendant, in filing claim with his local insurer, should have known that mails would be used in processing of his claim, so that evidence was sufficient to support convictions on mail fraud counts, despite absence of testimony pointing to defendant's mailing or causing to be mailed the proofs of loss. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

88. Arson ⇐37(1)
Conspiracy ⇐47(3)

There was sufficient evidence for jury to infer that defendant was associated with enterprise engaged in business of burning property with intent to defraud insurance companies, and his participation in its affairs, as proved by evidence of arson and mail frauds, was sufficient to support conviction on substantive count under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and on RICO conspiracy count for agreeing to participate. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq., 1962(c).

89. Arson ⇐37(1)
Post Office ⇐49(11)

Evidence was sufficient to support convictions for mail fraud and violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act arising out of arson of property owned by defendant and his receipt of $500 from insurer. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1341, 1961 et seq.

90. Post Office ⇐35(20)

Despite contention that no one in enterprise engaged in business of burning property with intent to defraud insurance companies did mailing or assisted in processing his claim for proceeds for burning of laundromat owned by him, fraudulent collection on insurance policy was part of scheme and it was not necessary that members of enterprise be involved in actual filing of claim in order for defendant to be convicted. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

91. Arson ⇐37(1)
Conspiracy ⇐47(3)

It was not necessary to show that defendant was in management position for

him to be convicted under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, and evidence that showed his association with enterprise engaged in business of burning property with intent to defraud insurance companies and that showed his participation in its affairs through arson and mail fraud activities was sufficient to support convictions on substantive and conspiracy counts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq., 1962(c).

92. Post Office ⇐49(11)

Evidence was sufficient to support mail fraud convictions of owner of property which was burned in order to collect from insurance company. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

93. Arson ⇐37(1)
Post Office ⇐49(11)

An arson and two acts of mail fraud in collection on insurance policy were evidence of predicate crimes related to affairs of enterprise engaged in business of burning with intent to defraud insurance companies, thus meeting requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of proof of pattern of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

94. Arson ⇐15

Despite contention that defendant was a mere "customer" of enterprise offering arson services, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act contemplated prosecution of such "customers" who engaged in pattern of racketeering activities in furtherance of affairs of enterprise since, by definition, such person became more than a customer of the enterprise. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq., 1962.

95. Conspiracy ⇐28(3)

Defendant's alleged separate conspiracy arising out of burning of property owned by him was not a separate conspiracy, but rather an integral part of enterprise engaged in business of burning property with intent to defraud insurance companies in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

96. Arson ⇐37(1)

Evidence, from which jury could infer association with enterprise engaged in business of burning property with intent to defraud insurance company and awareness of existence of ongoing arson operation was sufficient to support conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, despite contention that evidence did not show that defendant had knowledge that one whose arson services he purchased acted in concert with others. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

97. Conspiracy ⇐40.1

Party to conspiracy need not know identity, or even number of his confederates.

98. Conspiracy ⇐40.4

One claiming withdrawal from conspiracy has burden of proving he took some affirmative action to defeat or disallow purpose of conspiracy.

99. Arson ⇐37(1)

Evidence of defendant's involvement in burning of his hardware store was sufficient to establish that he engaged in pattern of racketeering activity in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

100. Conspiracy ⇐23

There can be no conspiracy involving only a defendant and government informer, because it takes two to conspire and government informer is not a true conspirator.

101. Conspiracy ⇐23

Even though link connecting many of the activities of conspirators was a government informer, conspiracy could be proved where conspiracy involved others besides government informer.

102. Post Office ⇐35(20)

Individual participant in scheme encompassing mail fraud will be liable for acts of his coschemers when such acts are within general scope of scheme; he can disclaim responsibility only if he undertakes some affirmative act of withdrawal. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

103. Post Office ⇐35(6)

One "causes" use of mails, for purposes of mail fraud prosecution, when he does some act in which it is reasonably foreseeable that mails will be used. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

104. Post Office ⇐49(11)

Evidence was sufficient to support conviction of defendant for mail fraud arising out of scheme to burn property and recover insurance proceeds, despite contention that there was no evidence to show that defendant asked, requested or insisted that insurance agent use mails in processing claim, where defendant was in insurance business so that it could not be seriously contended that he was unaware that mail would probably be used in processing claim, and evidence showed that defendant was part of the scheme. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

105. Arson ⇐37(1)

Defendant's participation in affairs of enterprise with common goal of burning buildings and collecting fire insurance proceeds, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, was supported by sufficient evidence, including defendant's initial association with principal "torch" of enterprise and insurance adjuster who, with knowledge of arson, processed fire loss claims. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

106. Commerce ⇐82.5

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, it is irrelevant that each defendant participated in enterprise's affairs through different, even unrelated crimes, so long as court may reasonably infer that each crime was intended to further enterprise's affairs. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.

107. Post Office ⇐48(8)

There was no fatal variance between indictment charging certain defendants with devising scheme to defraud insurance company by filing proof of loss stating that they did not know who set fire and the evidence, which also indicated that building's value listed on claim was inflated, where evidence abounded that defendant and adjuster falsely denied knowing who set fire. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341.

On Motion For New Trial

108. Criminal Law ⇐938(1)

Criteria for obtaining new trial on basis of newly discovered evidence are: evidence must be discovered following trial; facts must be alleged from which court may infer diligence on part of movant to discover new evidence; evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; evidence must be material; and evidence must be such that a new trial would probably produce new result.

109. Criminal Law ⇐945(1)

Trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence consisting of proffered testimony by codefendant who stated he would have testified for defendant in separate trial but that he did not want to testify in his own defense at joint trial, where "new" evidence was not such that second trial would probably produce a different result.

110. Criminal Law ⇐938(1)

Decision to grant or deny motion for new trial on basis of newly discovered evidence rests in sound discretion of trial judge.

111. Criminal Law ⇐1156(3)

Court of Appeals will reverse denial of motion for new trial on basis of newly discovered evidence only where it is shown that ruling was so clearly erroneous as to constitute abuse of discretion.

On Order of Forfeiture

112. Criminal Law ⇐1134(3)

Defendant's raising issue of forfeiture of insurance proceeds collected by him in his brief on appeal of his conviction was not sufficient to vest appellate jurisdiction, since order of forfeiture was a different judgment from sentence and commitment order, and separate notice of appeal was required.

113. Commerce ⇐82.5

Term "interest" in forfeiture provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-

cumulative or impeaching; evidence must be material; and evidence must be such that a new trial would probably produce new result.

109. Criminal Law ⇐945(1)

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D. Frank Winkles, Tampa, Fla., for Martino and Lostracco.

Raymond E. LaPorte, Tampa, Fla., for Russello.

Peter N. Macaluso, Tampa, Fla., for Rodriguez.

Gary L. Betz, U.S. Atty., Jacksonville, Fla., Eleanor J. Hill, Sp. Atty., Dept. of Justice, Tampa, Fla., Sara Criscitelli, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for U.S.

Roland A. Rosello (Court-appointed), Tampa, Fla., for Holt.

C. Steven Yerrid (Court-appointed), Tampa, Fla., for Palermo.

Arthur W. Fisher, III (Court-appointed), Tampa, Fla., for Fisher.

Guy E. Labalme (Court-appointed), Tampa, Fla., for Young.

Daniel J. Newman (Court-appointed), Tampa, Fla., for Macaluso.

Sam D. Pendino (Court-appointed), Tampa, Fla., for Scionti.

Gary R. Trombley, Claude H. Tison, Jr., Tampa, Fla., for Martino.

William T. Fussell, Tampa, Fla., for Guarino.

William B. Plowman, Tampa, Fla., for Farina.

Mark J. Kadish, Edward T. M. Garland, Atlanta, Ga., for Chase.

Barry A. Cohen, Richard Pippinger, Tampa, Fla., for Lazzara.

Michael Addison (Court-appointed), Tampa, Fla., for Morgado.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before TUTTLE, VANCE and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

POLITZ, Circuit Judge:

In the decade following enactment of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 *et seq.*, prosecutions under that Act have begun to follow the recognizable patterns we noted in *United States v. Malatesta*, 583 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978), *aff'd on reh. on other grounds*, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). The cases are characterized by lengthy indictments involving multiple defendants charged with diverse criminal activity. In the style of that embryonic tradition this appeal presents sixteen defendants with a combined total of eighty convictions.

The prosecutions we review were commenced by an eighty-three page, thirty-five count indictment, charging twenty-three defendants with mail fraud, RICO conspiracy and RICO substantive violations, specifying sixty-nine overt acts and fifty-six predicate acts of racketeering activity. Three defendants entered guilty pleas. The remaining twenty were jointly tried before a jury in a trial spanning three months. After deliberating three and one-half weeks, the jury found four defendants not guilty and sixteen defendants guilty of one

or more counts; all appeal.[1] The supplemented record on appeal includes 8 volumes of pleadings, nearly 100 volumes containing more than 11,000 pages of the testimony of over 200 witnesses, and 5 boxes of exhibits.

The indictment resulted from an investigation of a large number of suspected acts of arson occurring in Tampa and Miami, Florida between July 1973 and April 1976. The indictment charges that a group composed of an insurance adjuster, homeowners, promoters, investors and arsonists associated for the purpose of committing arson with the intent to defraud fire insurers. This association of individuals is characterized as an "enterprise," thus bringing the offenses within the purview of RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962.[2] Count 1, of which the sixteen defendants were convicted, charges a conspiracy to violate RICO, § 1962(d). Count 2, of which fifteen defendants were convicted, charges a substantive violation of RICO, § 1962(c). Counts 3 through 35 charge various defendants with violations of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341,[3] and aiding and abetting, 18 U.S.C. § 2,[4] arising out of the filing of insurance claims and receipt of payments for the losses resulting from the arsons.

Several issues are presented on appeal; some are common to all appellants, some to more than one, and some apply to only a particular appellant. Each appellant has filed a brief in which the arguments advanced by all other appellants are adopted. We shall, in general, address the common issues first and then review those issues pertinent to only a single appellant.

I. *The Setting—The Cast*

A summarization of the facts concerning each of the fifteen fires and subsequent insurance claims is set forth in the Appendix. We discuss these facts in somewhat greater detail during consideration of various contentions of insufficient evidence to

1. The following concurrent sentences were imposed: GUARINO—Counts 1 & 2: 12 years per count, Counts 3–10, 14–20: 5 years per count; SCIONTI—Counts 1 & 2: 12 years per count, Counts 3–6: 5 years per count; FARINA—Counts 1 & 2: 8 years per count, Counts 9 & 10: 5 years per count; LOSTRACCO—Counts 1 & 2: 9 years per count, Counts 17 & 18: 5 years per count; MARTINO—Counts 1 & 2: 10 years per count, Counts 14, 15 & 16: 5 years per count; MORGADO—Counts 1 & 2: 9 years per count, Counts 21 & 22: 5 years per count; MACALUSO—Counts 1 & 2: 9 years per count, Counts 7, 8, 11, 12 & 13: 5 years per count; LAZZARA—Counts 1 & 2: 10 years per count, Counts 5 & 6: 5 years per count; RODRIGUEZ—Counts 1 & 2: 8 years per count, Counts 7 & 8: 5 years per count; RUSSELLO—Counts 1 & 2: 10 years per count, Counts 28 & 29: 5 years per count; CHASE—Count 1: 6 years; PALERMO—Counts 1 & 2: 8 years per count, Counts 3 & 4: 5 years per count; BROWN—Counts 1 & 2: 8 years per count, Counts 30 & 31: 5 years per count; FISHER—Counts 1 & 2: 8 years per count, Counts 32 & 33: 5 years per count; YOUNG—Counts 1 & 2: 8 years per count, Counts 32 & 33: 5 years per count; HOLT—Counts 1 & 2: 9 years per count, Counts 21 & 22: 5 years per count (Youth Corrections Act).

2. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 provides in part:
   (c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity . . . .
   (d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.

3. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 provides in pertinent part: Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting so to do, places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or takes or receives therefrom, any such matter or thing, or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail according to the direction thereon . . . shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

4. 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides:
   (a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.
   (b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.

support the convictions. An overview of the charged conspiracy and enterprise, however, facilitates an understanding of the application of RICO, particularly because the degree of involvement varied with each defendant.

The arson ring began operating in 1973 when Paul Guarino and Frank Scionti hired Willie Noriega as their principal "torch." At first the arsonists only burned buildings already owned by those associated with the ring. Following a burning, the building owner filed an inflated proof of loss statement and collected the insurance proceeds from which his co-conspirators were paid. Later, ring members bought buildings suitable for burning, secured insurance in excess of value and, after a burning, made claims for the loss and divided the proceeds.

Different roles were played by those defendants comprising the enterprise. Joseph J. Carter was the insurance adjuster who, with knowledge of the arson, processed fire loss claims. In return for this service and for guiding others to insurance agencies where fire insurance could be secured in excess of the value of substandard property, Carter received a portion of the insurance proceeds. He pled guilty to nineteen counts and testified as a government witness.

Willie Noriega, the primary arsonist, pled guilty to all 35 counts and testified as the key government witness. Noriega was assisted in the "torching" by Paul Guarino, Frank Scionti, Joseph Macaluso and Victor Arrigo, who also testified as a government witness after pleading guilty to seven counts.

Sam C. Martino and Berton B. Chase provided financing for some of those who bought property targeted to be burned. Martino was in the real estate business and, in addition to arranging loans, located substandard property for use in the scheme. The defendants who acquired or aided in the acquisition of targeted property, secured excessive insurance and collected insurance payments included Carter, Guarino, Martino, Noriega, Macaluso, Amalia Morgado, John D. Fisher and Robert D. Young.

Several defendants already owned premises, mostly substandard, covered by fire insurance. They needed only the services of the arsonists and, in some instances, claims assistance. This group included Jimmy Farina, Joseph D. Lazzara, Rolando Gonzalez Rodrigues, Joseph C. Russello, John Alan Holt, Rosario Palermo and William H. Brown.

Finally, there were those who served as the contacts or go-betweens for persons who owned property they wished to have burned, or who wanted to acquire property for that purpose, and the arsonists. These "marketers" or "brokers" included Carter, Guarino, Scionti, Morgado, Martino and John Nicholas Lostracco.

With the basic structure of the "enterprise" and the roles of the various defendants in perspective, we now consider the assignments of error.

A. *Constitutionality of RICO*

The RICO statute is challenged on five grounds that, in the main, have been considered and dismissed in earlier cases. It is contended that RICO (1) punishes associational status, (2) does not apply to enterprises engaged solely in criminal activity, (3) is unconstitutionally vague, (4) operates *ex post facto*, and (5) is contrary to the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.

[1] In *United States v. Elliott*, 571 F.2d 880 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 953, 99 S.Ct. 349, 58 L.Ed.2d 344 (1978), we rejected the argument that RICO unconstitutionally punishes associational status; "its proscriptions are directed against conduct, not status." *Id.* at 903. Also in *Elliott*, and recently reaffirmed in *United States v. Diecidue*, 603 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 445 U.S. 946, 446 U.S. 912, 100 S.Ct. 1345, 100 S.Ct. 1842, 63 L.Ed.2d 781, 64 L.Ed.2d 266 (1980), we held RICO applicable to a group whose sole purpose was to engage in illegal activities. Appellants request a reconsideration of that position in light of contrary opinions from other circuits.[5] We are aware of the criticisms lev-

5. *See, e. g., United States v. Turkette*, 632 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1980), *cert. granted*, — U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 938, 67 L.Ed.2d 109 (U.S.1981); *United States v. Anderson*, 626 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1980).

eled at our decisions and we recognize that appellants' position is arguably meritorious. What appellants request, however, is not a course available to this panel but is a prerogative only of our court sitting *en banc*.

[2] Appellants' third contention, that RICO is unconstitutionally vague, was rejected in *United States v. Hawes*, 529 F.2d 472, 479 (5th Cir. 1976), in which we held that a person of average intelligence, upon reading the statute with the aid of relevant definitional provisions, "could not help but realize that they would be criminally liable for participating in 'any enterprise,' including their own, 'through a pattern of racketeering activity.'"

[3] Whether RICO is unconstitutional as an *ex post facto* law because of judicial enlargement is a question never before considered by us. The defendants argue that by applying RICO to illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises, we have deviated so far from an average person's understanding of RICO that an *ex post facto* effect results. It is not every judicial expansion of statutory construction that creates an *ex post facto* law; rather, it is only those which are "unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue." *Bouie v. City of Columbia*, 378 U.S. 347, 354, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1703, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964), *quoting* Hall, *General Principles of Criminal Law* at 61 (2d ed.1960).

[4] "Enterprise" is defined in § 1961 to include "any . . . group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." This language is broad and non-restrictive. It is not unreasonable to suggest that this language encompasses groups associated for the purpose of committing arson with the intent to defraud. This general, non-specific language negates the contention that expansive judicial interpretation is either unexpected or indefensible. We do not find that the interpretation given to RICO by this court has so deviated from what would be an average person's understanding that an *ex post facto* effect has occurred. This contention of constitutional abrogation is infirm.

[5] We likewise reject the proposition that RICO violates the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Appellants assert that RICO intrudes upon state sovereignty because the statute fails to require that the acts of racketeering *per se* affect interstate commerce. This argument ignores the essence of RICO which proscribes the furthering of the enterprise, not the predicate acts. The predicate acts are, in turn, proscribed by existing, enumerated state or federal laws. *United States v. Bright*, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1980). Appellants were not convicted of the state offense of arson; they were all (except Chase) convicted of the federal offenses of mail fraud and of conspiring to participate and participating in the affairs of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce.

We conclude and hold that the five grounds upon which appellants challenge the constitutionality of RICO are without merit.

B. *The Indictment*

[6] The indictment is challenged on several grounds, including insufficiency, duplicity and misapplication of RICO. It is also contended that there is a variance between the indictment and the evidence. First, it is argued that the required effect of interstate commerce is not sufficiently alleged. Like the indictment in *Diecidue, supra*, the instant indictment tracks the language of the statute as to the effect on interstate commerce. The indictment further charges that the defendants "did knowingly and willfully place and cause to be placed . . . in authorized depositories for mail matter to be sent and delivered according to the directions thereon by the Postal Service of the United States." The effect on interstate commerce is sufficiently alleged.

[7] Appellants contend that Count 1 charges multiple conspiracies and therefore the indictment is duplicitous. Appellants insist that each fire listed constitutes a separate conspiracy. To the contrary, "[t]he allegations addressed to the various substantive offenses committed as part of the conspiracy are merely descriptive of the single overall agreement." *Diecidue*, 603 F.2d at 546. The count is not duplicitous; it charges a single conspiracy involving several acts.

[8] It is next contended that the indictment is fatally defective because the appellants are charged under the wrong subsection of § 1962. It is argued that inasmuch as they are charged with associating with the other defendants, as the enterprise involved, they were mistakenly charged with violating subsection (c), rather than (b). This argument founders on the shoals of the language of RICO. Subsection (b) proscribes acquiring or maintaining an interest or control in an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; subsection (c) makes it unlawful for one associated with or employed by the enterprise to participate in the conduct of its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Appellants insist that § 1962(c) applies only to those who manage the enterprise, *i. e.*, the top coterie. We disagree. Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful to "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs." The word "conduct" is neither illusive nor mysterious, nor is its use unique to RICO. It is found in other statutes including, *inter alia*, 18 U.S.C. § 1955 which makes it a crime for one to conduct an illegal gambling business. In *United States v. Tucker*, 638 F.2d 1292 (5th Cir. 1981), we held that a waitress serving drinks to customers engaged in gambling conducts an illegal gambling business within the intendment of 18 U.S.C. § 1955. We concluded in *Tucker* that the word "conducts" simply means the performance of activities necessary or helpful to the operation of the enterprise.

[9] Finally, appellants cite *Kotteakos v. United States*, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), attacking the indictment on the ground that it alleges only one conspiracy while the government's evidence establishes multiple conspiracies. They contend that this results in a variance that substantially prejudiced their rights contrary to *Kotteakos*. We disagree. This argument has been considered in *Elliott*, *Diecidue*, and *Bright*, *supra*, and in *United States v. L'Hoste*, 609 F.2d 796 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, — U.S. —, 101 S.Ct. 104, 66 L.Ed.2d 39 (1980). In *L'Hoste* we resolved this issue adverse to the appellants, stating: "If the Government proves multiple conspiracies and a defendant's involvement in at least one of them, then clearly there is no variance affecting that defendant's substantial rights." 609 F.2d at 801, *citing United States v. Wayman*, 510 F.2d 1020 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 846, 96 S.Ct. 84, 46 L.Ed.2d 67 (1975). Following the path of *L'Hoste*, we find no variance affecting the appellants' substantial rights.

We find no merit in any of appellants' challenges to the indictment.

C. *Double Jeopardy*

[10] Appellants submit that the government should have been forced to elect between Counts 1 and 2 because prosecution on both does violence to the double jeopardy clause which "protects against multiple punishments for the same offense." *United States v. Smith*, 574 F.2d 308, 309 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 931, 99 S.Ct. 321, 58 L.Ed.2d 325 (1978), *quoting North Carolina v. Pearce*, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). The "same offense" test may be simply stated: If there is any difference in the elements to be proven, the two instances are not the same offense. *Blockburger v. United States*, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). Application of the rubric to RICO violations requires pause and reflection because of the nature of the RICO statute. We bear in mind that under *Blockburger* we must determine if one offense requires proof of a fact not required by the other.

[11] Prosecution of RICO substantive and conspiracy charges expectedly involves

considerable overlap in the evidence, especially where the enterprise exists as a consequence of persons associating and committing acts making up a pattern of racketeering activity. Such overlap does not occasion an automatic invocation of double jeopardy. *Iannelli v. United States*, 420 U.S. 770, 95 S.Ct. 1284, 43 L.Ed.2d 616 (1975).

[12] A RICO substantive charge requires proof of the existence of an enterprise which affects interstate commerce and that the defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs by committing at least two of the designated acts of racketeering activity. A RICO conspiracy charge requires the additional element of agreement; the defendant must have "objectively manifested an agreement to participate, directly or indirectly, in the affairs of an enterprise *through the commission of two or more predicate crimes.*" *Elliott*, 571 F.2d at 903 (emphasis in original). The *Elliott* court also stated that the agreement involved in a RICO conspiracy must include the vital element of agreeing to commit the predicate acts. Upon proof of the commission of racketeering activity, "the inference of an agreement to do so is unmistakable." *Id.* This statement has been interpreted to cast a shadow across the sun because it leads to the argument that the distinguishing element of subsection (d) (the agreement to violate) evaporates because proof of the substantive charge automatically includes proof of a conspiracy. *United States v. Anderson*, 626 F.2d 1358, 1368–69 n. 18 (8th Cir. 1980); Note, *Racketeers, Congress and the Courts: An Analysis of RICO*, 65 *Iowa L.Rev.* 837, 879 (1980). If the only evidence offered from which a jury can infer an agreement to participate in the enterprise is evidence of engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, the requisites for applying the double jeopardy rule would appear to exist.

[13] Albeit persuasive, this argument glosses over the essential teaching of *Blockburger* and obfuscates the inquiry whether the two counts charge the same offense. The aegis of the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment is not invoked merely by showing that a jury had the opportunity to convict on two counts by drawing appropriate inferences from the same evidence. "[T]he *Blockburger* test looks *not* to the evidence adduced at trial but focuses on the elements of the offense charged." *United States v. Cowart*, 595 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir. 1979). That the distinguishing element can be proven by the same evidence as that used to convict on another count does not bring the offenses within the context of double jeopardy. *United States v. Dunbar*, 591 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1979), *aff'd on reh. on other grounds*, 611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc). The RICO substantive and RICO conspiracy convictions are not vitiated by the double jeopardy clause.

D. *Pre-trial Matters*

Appellants request our review of certain pre-trial matters they contend constitute reversible error. These include motions for bill of particulars, requests for *Brady* material and the medical examination into Willie Noriega's competence to testify.

[14–16] It is argued that because of the complexity of the case, the motions for bill of particulars should have been granted to prevent confusion which hindered the defendants from understanding the nature of the charges against them. Action on a motion for bill of particulars is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. We may reverse a ruling denying the motion only if a defendant demonstrates that he was "actually surprised at trial and thus incurred prejudice to his substantial rights by the denial." *Diecidue*, 603 F.2d at 563. No such demonstration has been made to this court; there has been no abuse of discretion and no reversible error exists.

Appellants contend that the government failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of *Brady v. Maryland*, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny. They specifically call our attention to inconsistent statements made prior to and during trial by a government witness and a letter sent to the U.S. Attorney by a

psychiatric expert for the government. The alleged inconsistent statements were made by a witness with respect to a 1972 fire in which two arsonists died.[6] In her first statement to the police shortly after the fire, the witness said that Robert Bradwell (one of the arsonists who died) had told her that he had been robbed and set on fire by unknown persons. At trial, she testified that Bradwell had asked her to make that statement, but that he also told her what really happened: he had been burned while he, Lester Oates and Paul Guarino set fire to the Kakeland Bakery.

[17-19] As impeaching evidence, the prior inconsistent statement would fall within disclosure requirements because *Brady* encompasses impeachment evidence as well as evidence favorable to the accused on the issue of guilt. *United States v. Auten*, 632 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1980). Failure of the government to disclose information useful only for impeachment, however, mandates reversal only if defendants demonstrate that the undisclosed evidence probably would have resulted in acquittal. *United States v. Anderson*, 574 F.2d 1347 (5th Cir. 1978). It cannot be seriously contended that this one statement made by one of the more than one hundred government witnesses would probably have resulted in acquittal. The claim is devoid of merit.

[20, 21] The remaining asserted *Brady* violation concerns a letter written to the U.S. Attorney by the psychiatrist who served as the government's witness on rebuttal. In the letter the psychiatrist opined that Willie Noriega was not psychotic in 1963 but that he had self-induced psychotic symptoms by using drugs in an attempt to avoid prosecution for arson. The letter was given to the defendants after the doctor testified, consistent with the requirements of the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500. This disclosure expunged any earlier error because "when alleged *Brady* material is contained in Jencks Act material, disclosure is generally timely if the government complies with the Jencks Act." *Anderson*, 574 F.2d at 1352. This *Brady* claim is also without merit.

Pursuant to a defense request prior to trial, the trial court exercised its discretion and appointed an expert to conduct a competency examination of Noriega. *See United States v. Roach*, 590 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1979); *United States v. Jackson*, 576 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1978). The psychiatrist was instructed to examine Noriega and formulate an opinion about his present mental state and whether he was then able to differentiate reality from fantasy and accurately to remember and relate events that occurred during the prior five years. The expert determined Noriega was competent to testify at trial. Appellants insist the court erred in not requiring the psychiatrist also to determine Noriega's mental condition during the time period of the alleged offenses.

[22, 23] Whether a witness is competent to testify is a threshold question of law to be answered by the judge. *Roach, supra*; Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Vol. 11 § 377 (13th ed. C. Torcia 1972). It is left to the jury to assess a witness's credibility and the weight to be accorded his testimony. Because a witness's mental state during the period about which he proposes to testify is a matter which affects his credibility, it is a jury determination and thus not germane to competency to testify. We posted this trail in *United States v. Partin*, 493 F.2d 750, 762 (5th Cir. 1974), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977):

> The readily apparent principle is that the jury should, within reason, be informed of all the matters affecting a witness's credibility to aid in their determination of the truth .... It is just as reasonable that a jury be informed of a witness's mental incapacity at a time about which he proposes to testify as it would be for the jury to know that he then suffered an impairment of sight or

6. This fire was not the subject of a mail fraud count, but was named as an overt act in Count 1.

hearing. It all goes to the ability to comprehend, know, and correctly relate the truth.

See also Greene v. Wainwright, 634 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981).

[24] In the case at bar the trial judge was not obligated to ask the court-appointed expert to determine Noriega's mental capacity at the time of the alleged offenses as well as his competence to testify. It would not have been error had the trial judge done so, for this would have been an additional item of evidence for the jury to consider in making its credibility assessment. Nevertheless, to decline to grant this defense request does not constitute reversible error. The defendants had ample opportunity to show Noriega's mental condition at the time about which he testified. Defense experts testified, as did acquaintances of Noriega who knew him during the arson spree. Furthermore, the jury was properly instructed to consider evidence of a witness's mental condition at the time of the incidents in judging the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given to that witness's testimony.

E. *Joint Trial versus Severance*

[25-27] Each appellant alleges prejudice by the joinder of his trial with the other defendants and that the trial judge committed reversible error in failing to grant the repeated motions for severance. Joinder was proper under Rule 8(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. *See Bright, supra*. Accordingly, defendants must rely on Rule 14, Fed.R.Crim.P., which permits severance if a defendant is prejudiced by the joinder.[7] On a Rule 14 severance motion, the trial judge is required to weigh the prejudice inherent in a joint trial in light of the realities of judicial economy and to sever defendants as the needs of justice dictate. *United States v. McLaurin*, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 1020, 98 S.Ct. 743, 54 L.Ed.2d 767 (1978). The denial of a motion to sever is reversible only for abuse of discretion. An appellant's burden of showing prejudice is onerous; the general test is:

> whether under all the circumstances of the particular case, as a practical matter, it is within the capacity of the jurors to follow the court's admonitory instructions and accordingly to collate and appraise the independent evidence against each defendant solely upon that defendant's own acts, statements and conduct. In sum, can the jury keep separate the evidence that is relevant to each defendant and render a fair and impartial verdict as to him? If so, though the task be difficult, severance should not be granted.

Peterson v. United States, 344 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1965).

To buttress their claim of prejudice, appellants submit an impressive litany: there were twenty defendants, most with Spanish or Italian surnames; thirty-five counts (only thirty-three remained after Noriega pled guilty) were charged, but many of the defendants were charged in only a few of the counts; the trial lasted three months; the jury heard over 200 witnesses, some testifying against many defendants, others testifying against only a few; and there were nineteen defense counsel and three prosecuting attorneys, all within the confines of a modest sized courtroom. Appellants argue that the totality of these facts created a "circus" atmosphere rather than that which should prevail for a serious criminal trial.

[28] We are keenly aware that joint trials, especially those involving numerous defendants and multiple charges, carry substantial risks of manifest unfairness. We do not encourage trials en masse. We must, however, reckon with the realities of this type prosecution. The Constitution does not guarantee a trial free from the burdens that inevitably accompany such a trial; rather, it requires that the potential for transferability of guilt be minimized to

7. Rule 14, Fed.R.Crim.P., provides in pertinent part:

> If it appears that a defendant ... is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment ... or by such joinder for trial together, the court may ... grant a severance of defendants.

the extent possible in order to "individualize each defendant in his relation to the mass." *Kotteakos, supra; United States v. LeCompte*, 599 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1313, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980); *Elliott, supra*. We recently confronted this same issue in *United States v. Morrow*, 537 F.2d 120, 136 (5th Cir. 1976), *cert. denied*, 430 U.S. 956, 97 S.Ct. 1602, 51 L.Ed.2d 806 (1977), and our discussion relative to severance is appropriate here:

> In reviewing a claim of undue complexity and confusion, an appellate court looks to the totality of the circumstances in striking a balance between the interest in judicial economy and the need to protect the rights of the individual defendant. A joint trial of twenty-three defendants, charged with conspiracy and numerous substantive counts, clearly raised the possibility that the jury might cumulate the evidence introduced by the Government on all counts and against all defendants to find guilty a defendant whose connection with the conspiracy was at best marginal. The pernicious effect of cumulation, however, is best avoided by precise instructions to the jury on the admissibility and proper uses of the evidence introduced by the Government. The remedy of severance is justified only if the prejudice flowing from a joint trial is clearly beyond the curative powers of a cautionary instruction. Where the Government charges a single conspiracy, as it did here, much of the evidence introduced ultimately bears, at least indirectly, on the agreement of the co-conspirators. Once the Government has satisfactorily established the existence of the conspiracy, the same evidence used to convict a particular defendant is admissible against all co-defendants shown to be members of the conspiracy. Given this state of affairs, the interest in judicial economy understandably exerts strong pressures in favor of a joint trial.

In the case *sub judice* Judge Hodges faced a formidable task. He conducted the trial with great skill and with a judicial professionalism much to be admired. He minimized the potential transference of guilt with every tool at his command. He gave careful, detailed instructions about the elements of RICO conspiracy and RICO substantive charges, doing so, as appropriate, as they related to each defendant. Proper uses of evidence were explained. Judge Hodges met the burden of avoiding the "pernicious effect of cumulation."

[29] Notwithstanding the very skillful presiding of the trial judge, appellants argue that the totality of the circumstances were such that a jury had to be confused and unable to individualize the verdicts simply because of the volume of evidence which inundated them. We acknowledge the validity of this concern and, were it not for the manner in which Judge Hodges handled this obviously difficult trial and our review of the verdicts in light of the record, we might be prone to agree with appellants. We finally resolve this contention by "look[ing] to the verdict. Convictions will invariably be sustained if it may be inferred from the verdict that the jury 'meticulously sifted the evidence' as where it acquits on certain counts." *Tillman v. United States*, 406 F.2d 930, 936 (5th Cir.), *vacated in part on other grounds*, 395 U.S. 830, 89 S.Ct. 2143, 23 L.Ed.2d 742 (1969), *quoting* 8 Moore, *Federal Practice* ¶ 14.04[1], at 14–15 (2d ed. 1968). It is apparent from the verdicts reached that the jury, after more than three weeks of deliberation, did "meticulously sift" the evidence. Four defendants were acquitted on all charges; eight others were convicted on some charges but acquitted on others. Although coming close, defendants have not met the burden imposed to compel our finding of an abuse of discretion.[8]

8. We are mindful of our recent decision in *United States v. Diaz-Munoz*, 632 F.2d 1330 (5th Cir. 1980), where we found that the jury had not been able to evaluate each defendant's position properly. That case is not controlling. In *Diaz-Munoz* we found that misjoinder had occurred; in the case at bar joinder was proper. Furthermore, in *Diaz-Munoz* the jury deliberated for less than three hours (including

F. *Trial Errors*

Appellants allege reversible error because of prosecutorial misconduct, misconduct of defense counsel and various other trial errors. They maintain that whereas the alleged errors singularly might not be sufficient to mandate reversals, their cumulative effect denied appellants a fair trial, warranting reversals of the convictions. After examining each error assigned, we are compelled to disagree.

1. Jencks Act

[30, 31] Appellants condemn the manner in which the government conducted interviews with its witnesses ostensibly to avoid producing Jencks Act material under 18 U.S.C. § 3500,[9] calling it "the most abusive conduct by the government." It became evident during trial that government attorneys and FBI agents held several interviews with potential witnesses but no written or recorded statements were taken. Appellants argue that the government purposely failed to record the interviews because they wanted to hinder the defense and that such tactics by the prosecution should not be tolerated.

[32] No requirement has been brought to our attention that all interviews must be recorded or that interview notes must be reduced to writing and signed or otherwise approved by the witness. We cannot presume that the prosecutor acted in bad faith by failing to reduce his notes to statement form. That interviewers usually take notes rather than verbatim statements was noted by Justice Powell in his concurrence in *Goldberg v. United States*, 425 U.S. 94, 122 n.9, 96 S.Ct. 1338, 1345 n.9, 47 L.Ed.2d 603 (1976), wherein he stated:

> Indeed, only the foolish or exceptionally talented counsel will depend solely on his memory when preparing for the examination of a key witness. But the fact that counsel usually will take notes does not mean that the notes often will be "statements." Counsel rarely take down verbatim what witnesses say in these preparatory conferences. Consequently, prosecutors' notes may be expected to meet the requirements of [18 U.S.C. § 3500](e)(2) very infrequently. (Citations omitted.) The notes taken will vary from cryptic "memory jogs" to full summaries of the anticipated testimony.

Appellants' claim of error on this issue is without merit.

2. Opening Statements

Comments made during opening statements by two of the twenty-two lawyers involved in this trial have been singled out and categorized as highly prejudicial and sufficient to warrant reversal. One statement is attributed to the prosecutor who informed the jury that Noriega and his family had been relocated to a different part of the country as a result of his cooperation with the government and that Noriega had received approximately $34,000 from the government. Defendants contend this was an improper reference to the federal Witness Protection Program and was a suggestion to the jury that the defendants were a source of danger to Noriega.

Reference to a witness's participation in the Witness Protection Program was also at issue in the appeal after remand in *United States v. Partin*, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 903, 98 S.Ct. 298, 54 L.Ed.2d 189 (1977). In *Partin* we recognized that disclosure of such participation is

lunch); in the case we review the jury deliberated over three weeks.

9. Under the Jencks Act, the government is required to produce any statement of a witness, after that witness testifies and upon motion of the defendant, that is in the possession of the United States and relates to the subject matter to which the witness testifies. "Statement," within the context of this Act, means one that is written, transcribed, or stenographically, mechanically or electronically recorded and is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by the witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement. It is undisputed that notes taken by an interviewer during an interview with the witness do not qualify as a statement under the Jencks Act. *United States v. Cuesta*, 597 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1979); *United States v. Scaglione*, 446 F.2d 182 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 941, 92 S.Ct. 284, 30 L.Ed.2d 254 (1971).

a delicate matter because the jury might infer that the defendant is a threat to the witness or his family. We made clear that the prosecution may not exploit the possibility of such an inference. At the same time, however, we recognized that the defendant should be permitted to show that a witness, while in the program, received substantial benefits. Such information is relevant in the ultimate determination of the witness's credibility.

[33, 34] Anticipating that Noriega's receipt of benefits from the government would be used to impeach his credibility, the prosecutor chose to inform the jury of this in his opening statement. This information is admissible and we cannot say that the prosecutor's brief comment at the beginning of trial was an unfair exploitation.[10]

[35] The remaining comment during opening statements to which defendants assign error was made by counsel for co-defendant Lostracco who commented that his client, presented as entirely innocent of the charges brought against him, was forced as a result of the indictment to sit down with a "bunch of gangsters." Defendants argue that this comment was highly prejudicial, especially in light of the surnames of most of the defendants. While we do not condone such tactics or language by any counsel in any stage of a trial, we are not persuaded that it was so prejudicial as to mandate reversals. The statement in question was made at the beginning of a lengthy trial and was not repeated. After viewing the entire record, we are not convinced that the improper statement influenced the jury at all. We find the error harmless.

3. Defense Counsel's Comment on His Client's Decision to Testify

[36] Counsel for Lostracco is the subject of another assignment of error. In closing argument, he made repeated references to Lostracco's testimony, emphasizing that his client had chosen to testify. The other defendants contend that this was an improper reference to their decisions not to testify, thus causing reversible error. This argument was raised and rejected in *Diecidue, supra*, wherein we noted that while references to an accused's silence is reversible error, "mere favorable observation on the willingness of one of several co-defendants to testify" is not reversible error. 603 F.2d at 553. This assignment is without merit.

4. Assertion of Fifth Amendment Privilege

[37, 38] Another argument raised by appellants was similarly rejected in *Diecidue*, a case in which Willie Noriega also testified as a government witness. In both trials, Noriega chose to exercise his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. In both appeals the defendants have argued that Noriega's decision to exercise his Fifth Amendment right denied them the right of confrontation. The questions which prompted assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege were almost identical in both proceedings. In *Diecidue* we noted that where a witness legitimately invokes the privilege, the testimony is to be struck only if the defendants' resultant inability to

10. Defendants also complain about various comments made by the prosecutor during closing argument. Specifically, they point to remarks about "defense lawyer tactics," the "millionaire defense," the individual victims of the arsons, and his response to defendant Chase's argument by saying "the government's evidence has been truthful." We do not find that such comments meet the test for a new trial as again recently stated in *United States v. Lichenstein*, 610 F.2d 1272, 1281 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 447 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 2991, 64 L.Ed.2d 856 (1980), *quoting United States v. Blevins*, 555 F.2d 1236, 1240 (5th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 1016, 98 S.Ct. 733, 54 L.Ed.2d 761 (1978): "[p]rosecutorial misconduct in the form of improper comments . . . 'must be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial.'" Furthermore, the prosecutor's comment on rebuttal that his evidence was "truthful" was proper because "[t]he prosecutor . . . may even present what amounts to a bolstering argument if it is specifically done in rebuttal to assertions made by defense counsel in order to remove any stigma cast upon him or his witnesses." *United States v. Dorr*, 636 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1981).

complete their questioning creates a substantial risk of prejudice. Generally, it is only when a witness refuses to answer questions on direct, as opposed to collateral issues, that his testimony is excised. The questions asked of Noriega were aimed at undermining his credibility. His credibility had already been the subject of intense attack during cross-examination. Therefore, as in *Diecidue*, "the responses illicited by defendants' questions would have been mere cumulative evidence of credibility." 603 F.2d at 552. The trial judge's refusal to strike the responses was not erroneous. This same rationale applies to defendants' argument relating to witness Joseph Carter's decision to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.[11]

5. Noriega's Competence to Testify

[39, 40] Noriega's competence to testify has been attacked by several defendants who contend that Noriega was incompetent and that his testimony was incredible as a matter of law. As discussed earlier, whether a witness is competent to testify is a question of law for the trial judge. Unless an abuse of discretion is demonstrated, the trial judge's decision will not be disturbed. *United States v. Killian*, 524 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir. 1975), *cert. denied*, 425 U.S. 935, 96 S.Ct. 1667, 48 L.Ed.2d 177 (1976). No such demonstration has been made.

6. Admissibility of Plea Agreement

Appellants object to the introduction into evidence of Noriega's plea agreement. Complaints are specifically made with reference to portions of the plea agreement that mention needed protection for Noriega and his family and his promise to testify "truthfully." Appellants concede that they cross-examined Noriega extensively about his plea agreement; nevertheless, they allege that the areas of the agreement to which they object were not covered in their cross-examination.

[41–43] The possibility that the jury would infer that the defendants were the source of danger to Noriega was eliminated by the trial judge's comments to the jury that the source of the threat was not the defendants in the instant case, but rather the defendants in another case in which Noriega had testified. As relates to the issue of the threat, it was not error to allow the jury to view the agreement between Noriega and the government. Nor did the plea agreement constitute an impermissible affirmation or bolstering by the prosecutor of the credibility of a government witness. The statement in the plea agreement that Noriega promised to testify "truthfully" does not constitute error-laden vouching for the credibility of a government witness. *United States v. Arroyo-Angulo*, 580 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir.), *cert. denied*, 439 U.S. 913, 99 S.Ct. 285, 58 L.Ed.2d 260, and 439 U.S. 1005, 99 S.Ct. 618, 58 L.Ed.2d 681 (1978), and 439 U.S. 1131, 99 S.Ct. 1052, 59 L.Ed.2d 93 (1979); *United States v. Isaacs*, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974). As we stated in *United States v. Rosson*, 441 F.2d 242, 244 (5th Cir. 1971): "If the defense relies upon the existence of the plea bargain to attack the credibility of the witness, it is not then entitled to preclude the jury from being apprised of additional matters relevant to the bargain so as to leave an incorrect inference that the witness has made a better bargain for himself . . . than in fact he has made." The court properly admitted the plea bargain agreement into evidence; appellants' arguments to the contrary are rejected.[12]

11. Defendants also claim that their right of cross-examination was impaired when Noriega asserted his attorney-client privilege in response to the question whether he had asked his attorney to work with the U.S. Attorney on his behalf. This claim is frivolous. The response was given only once during extensive examination. Noriega was subsequently asked whether he had sought help from the U.S. Attorney and he answered affirmatively. No possible harm resulted from his initial assertion of the privilege.

12. Appellants also contend that the document was inadmissible as hearsay. This argument misses the mark. The document was not introduced to establish the truth of the factual assertions contained therein; rather, it was merely introduced to establish the fact of its existence and contents. As such, it was not hearsay.

7. References to Polygraph Tests

[44, 45] During cross-examination, Noriega made reference to his willingness to take a lie detector test.[13] The defendants argue that the comment was so prejudicial that a mistrial should have been granted. It is currently the law in this circuit that the results of a polygraph test are inadmissible in evidence. *United States v. Clark*, 598 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1979). Because the jury is not allowed to know the results of the test, appellants insist that to permit a witness to testify concerning his willingness to take the test constitutes improper bolstering. Although we agree that Noriega's response to the question was improper, we do not agree that it was prejudicial to the point of measurably affecting the jury's verdicts. The trial judge not only cautioned the jury twice to disregard Noriega's comment, he also told them why such an instruction was being given. He explained that polygraph tests have not yet achieved sufficient scientific reliability to be admissible in evidence. If there was any prejudice to the defendants, such prejudice was cured by the careful manner in which the trial judge handled the situation.[14]

8. Comment on Defendants' Failure to Testify

Appellants suggest that an exchange that occurred after Noriega's response as set forth in footnote 13, was grounds for a mistrial. They claim that the prosecutor made an improper reference to the decision of some of the defendants not to testify. That reference ostensibly occurred during the following exchange:

THE COURT: Well, I will instruct the jury to altogether disregard that last part of the witness's answer.

MR. COHEN: Judge, I would like to be heard on that outside the presence of the jury. I think—

THE COURT: Well, you may.

MR. COHEN: I think that my client will be more than willing to enter that sort of stipulation.

MR. HOGUE: (The Prosecutor) Objection to counsel testifying. If he wants to take the stand he may.

At this point the judge excused the jury and held a discussion with counsel.

[46] The comment by the prosecutor that "If he wants to take the stand he may," immediately followed the prosecutor's objection to defense counsel testifying. It strains credulity to believe that the prosecutor was referring to a defendant. To accept the appellants' argument we would have to view that statement out of the context in which it was said, a clearly impermissible approach. *See United States v. Austin*, 585 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, the statement was not of "such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify." *United States v. White*, 444 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 300, 30 L.Ed.2d 266 (1971). It was not a reversible error reference to the defendants' election not to testify.

9. Miscellaneous Improper Comments

[47, 48] Various responses given by witnesses during the trial are challenged as

13. The comment arose during the following exchange:

Q. (By defense attorney Mr. Cohen) Now, do you know, sir, that you like to do a good job as a witness in this case for the Government; do you not?
A. I'm testifying to the truth, sir.
Q. Would you like to see the Government win this case?
A. It doesn't make any difference to me.
Q. You don't care; is that your testimony?
A. My testimony is I am here to testify to the truth, and I am willing to take a lie detector test if your client is.

14. There was another reference made to the polygraph test by government witness James Earl Wright. Under cross-examination concerning a pending state charge against him, Wright said that he really was not concerned about the charges because he knew he could beat those charges by taking a polygraph test. The reference had nothing to do with the charges that were the subject of the trial. No prejudice occurred as a result of that fleeting comment.

being so prejudicial that they denied the defendants a fair trial. Our review of the record leads to the conclusion that these responses did not result in prejudice to the defendants. In reaching this conclusion we follow the guidelines expressed in *United States v. Hyde*, 448 F.2d 815, 847 (5th Cir. 1971), *cert. denied*, 404 U.S. 1058, 92 S.Ct. 736, 30 L.Ed.2d 745 (1972): "Allegedly improper statements should not be viewed in the abstract. The question is what impact they had in the context of the particular trial in terms of their relevance and the quantity of untainted evidence in the case." As we noted earlier, this trial lasted over three months and the record includes more than 11,000 pages of testimony. We cannot say that the four or five responses complained of by the defendants measureably affected the jury in any way. This complaint is likewise without merit.

10. Exclusion of Hearsay Testimony

Lazzara argues that certain hearsay testimony was wrongfully stricken from the record, resulting in prejudicial and reversible error. We do not agree. The hearsay testimony was elicited from witness Ruth McElroy, the mother of Hiram McElroy who was working for Lazzara at a Miami laundromat when it burned. Noriega testified that, as part of the scheme, he took Hiram McElroy to the bus station in Miami and then returned to the laundromat to set the fire. Noriega admitted responsibility for the fire, saying he set it at Lazzara's request. Hiram McElroy, on the other hand, allegedly told his mother that he was sleeping in the laundromat when the fire broke out and that earlier he had been cooking on a hot plate and may have left it on. McElroy died prior to trial and Lazzara tried to get his statement into evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 804(b)(3), Fed.R.Evid. The trial judge ruled the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Rule 804 provides in part:

> (a) Definition of unavailability.—'Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant—
>
> * * * * * *
>
> (4) is unable to be present or to testify ... because of death ....
>
> (b) Hearsay exceptions.—The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:
>
> * * * * * *
>
> (3) Statement against interest.—A statement which ... at the time of its making ... so far tended to subject him to civil ... liability ... that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true.

In relying on this hearsay exception rule, Lazzara argues that McElroy subjected himself to civil liability by admitting possible fault in the laundromat fire.

[49] We find no error in the judge's decision to strike the hearsay testimony. As reflected by the specific language used in Rule 804(b)(3), the statement against interest must be almost a direct, outright statement that the person was legally at fault. McElroy's statement simply indicated that he might have been the one who caused the fire. There was testimony from fire inspectors that a hot plate was involved but that the fire was the result of arson. We agree with the trial judge that McElroy's statement was not a declaration sufficiently subjecting him to civil liability to invoke the quoted exception to the hearsay rule.

11. Sequestration Breaks

[50] Appellants complain that once the trial judge chose to sequester the jury, it was error for him then to allow breaks in that sequestration by permitting the jurors to visit with family members without repeatedly reinstructing them about avoiding outside influence. Before a reversal will lie on this ground, appellants "must demonstrate a substantial likelihood that some prejudice did result." *United States v. Harris*, 458 F.2d 670, 675 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 195, 34 L.Ed.2d 145 (1972).

[51, 52] The trial judge has the discretion to decide whether to disperse the jury. *Tyler v. United States*, 397 F.2d 565 (5th

Cir. 1968), *cert. denied*, 394 U.S. 917, 89 S.Ct. 1187, 22 L.Ed.2d 450 (1969). In the cases dealing with breaks in sequestration, emphasis is usually placed upon the fact that the judge reminded the jury to avoid outside influence. *United States v. Banks*, 485 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1973), *cert. denied*, 416 U.S. 987, 94 S.Ct. 2391, 40 L.Ed.2d 764 (1974); *Tyler, supra*. In the instant case, while the jury was not reinstructed prior to every break in sequestration, they were constantly reminded during the course of the trial (at which time they were not under order of sequestration) not to discuss the case with anyone and to avoid reading any publicity concerning the trial. While sequestered, and pursuant to the judge's orders, the U.S. Marshals (in whom custody of jurors is entrusted) repeatedly reminded the jurors to refrain from discussing the case. Newspapers brought in by family members were edited before being given to the jurors. There can be no doubt that the jurors were fully aware of their responsibilities.

The jurors deliberated for 3½ weeks; their sequestration spanned three weekends. We see no error in the judge allowing jurors to visit with their families at the hotel on Sundays. In light of the precautions taken by the judge during the trial, and through the marshals during deliberations, we see no basis for the contention that the defendants were prejudiced by the judge's failure to reinstruct the jurors personally or to voir dire each one concerning possible exposure after the visitation periods. The allowance of family visits was a reasonable, humane and understanding act by the trial judge. No reversible error lurks within.

12. Miscellany

Finally, Russello urges three other assignments of error: a biased grand jury, exclusion of evidence about Noriega's character and an improper jury charge.

a. Grand Jury Bias

Russello contends he was deprived of his right to an unbiased grand jury because of two incidents. First, he complains that the prosecutor should not have called him to testify before the grand jury because after he received his subpoena, his attorney advised the prosecutor that Russello intended to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege. Russello was nevertheless called as a witness; he exercised his Fifth Amendment privilege.

[53, 54] It has long been recognized that "[c]itizens generally are not constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas." *Branzburg v. Hayes*, 408 U.S. 665, 682, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2657, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). Our courts have repeatedly reaffirmed "the historically grounded obligation of every person to appear and give his evidence before the Grand Jury." *United States v. Dionisio*, 410 U.S. 1, 9, 93 S.Ct. 764, 769, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). "The personal sacrifice involved is a part of the necessary contribution of the individual to the welfare of the public." *Blair v. United States*, 250 U.S. 273, 281, 39 S.Ct. 468, 471, 63 L.Ed. 979 (1919). Russello's claim that he should not have been called after revealing his intention to remain silent is without merit.

[55] Russello also alleges that after his appearance before the grand jury, he learned that the prosecutor, in the presence of the grand jury, told Farina that he, Farina, was a disgrace for exercising his right to remain silent. Russello argues that this was also a reflection on his right to remain silent. He points to no specifics to show that the jury imputed to him the prosecutor's comment and attitude toward Farina. We do not agree that the prosecutor's comment about Farina was an attack on Russello's character. Russello was not denied the right to an unbiased grand jury.

b. Exclusion of Evidence

The thrust of Russello's second contention is that he and his family were threatened by Noriega, that his building had been burned without his knowledge and that he had paid Noriega only because Noriega extorted the money. To support the argument that Noriega was a violent man, and to rebut inferences from government testimony to the contrary, Russello called a wit-

ness who was to testify about shooting Noriega after Noriega threatened the witness's employer. The trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 608(b).

Russello relies on *United States v. Opager*, 589 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1979), where the trial judge excluded certain business records which would have shown that one of the government's key witnesses was lying about a fact material to Opager's defense. In response to Opager's defense of entrapment, the government witness testified, in an effort to show the defendant's predisposition to commit the crime, that he had worked with the defendant and had seen her engage in the same criminal conduct. The business records Opager sought to introduce would have established that she and the witness had not worked together at the pertinent time. In reversing the conviction, we emphasized that the evidence did not merely go to the witness's character for truthfulness, but rather was relevant specifically to contradict the witness's testimony as to a *material issue*. *Opager* is distinguishable from the situation in the case at bar.

[56] Although Russello relied on the defense that he acted in response to threats from Noriega, Noriega's threats against the employer of the witness called by Russello did not relate directly to Russello as the excluded testimony in *Opager* related directly to the defendant. The material issue here was not whether Noriega had threatened the witness's employer, but whether Noriega had threatened Russello. The evidence was not relevant to a "material issue" within the context of *Opager*. We find no error in the exclusion of this testimony.

c. Jury Instruction

[57] Russello contends that the trial judge did not correctly charge the jury as to the evidence required for a mail fraud conviction. The challenged portion of the jury charge states: "A statement or representation may also be 'false' or 'fraudulent' when it constitutes a half-truth, or effectively conceals a material fact, with intent to defraud." Russello relies on *United States v. Meadows*, 598 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1979), in which we held that a similar instruction created reversible error. There is one dispositive difference between the charge in *Meadows* and the charge *sub judice*. The trial judge in *Meadows* stated that "under the law fraud may result from statements of half-truths or the concealment of material facts." *Id.* at 987. The statement that created reversible error resulted from the failure by the court to remind the jury of the intent required to convict. In the instant case the trial judge added four critical words to the instruction that had been found wanting in *Meadows*; the instruction complained of here concludes with the words "with intent to defraud." That phrase takes this instruction out of the *Meadows* category and compels our rejection of this claim.

G. *Sufficiency of the Evidence*

[58] Most of the appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions on both the RICO and the mail fraud charges. We recently reiterated the standard for review of such a challenge in *United States v. Marx*, 635 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir. 1981):

> In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must view all the evidence, direct and circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government, and must accept all reasonable inferences and credibility choices that tend to support the jury's verdict. (Citations omitted.) The standard of review is whether a jury could reasonably find that the evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or, put another way, whether a reasonably minded jury must necessarily entertain a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

With respect to the conspiracy convictions, the test on appeal is whether there is substantial evidence to support the verdicts. *Id.; United States v. Malatesta*, 590 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir.) (en banc), *cert. denied*, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). We shall review the RICO convic-

tions separate from the mail fraud convictions because of the obvious difference in the evidence required to sustain convictions.

1. RICO Convictions

[59] Five necessary elements comprise a substantive RICO charge. The government must prove (1) the existence of the enterprise; (2) that the enterprise affected interstate commerce; (3) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (4) that he participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise; and (5) that he participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.

In reviewing the RICO convictions we bear in mind the broad reach of the RICO statute, as articulated in *Elliott*, 571 F.2d at 903:

> The substantive proscriptions of the RICO statute apply to insiders *and outsiders*—those merely "associated with" an enterprise—who participate directly *and indirectly* in the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. (Citations omitted.) Thus, the RICO net is woven tightly to trap even the smallest fish, those peripherally involved with the enterprise. (Emphasis in original.)

Even with a tightly woven net however, a fish, of whatever size, cannot be trapped unless he is "employed by or associated with" the enterprise. In other words, the fish must first be swimming in the stream where the net has been placed before we reach the question of size. The indications from *Elliott* that only minimal association is necessary have caused fine lines to be drawn in determining those who are guilty of violating RICO and those who are not. A defendant must know *something* about his co-defendants' related activities which make up the enterprise, but it is not necessary that he be aware of *all* racketeering activities of each of his partners in the enterprise. *Diecidue.*

[60, 61] To convict on a charge of conspiracy, the government must prove that the defendant had knowledge of the conspiracy and that he intended to join in the objectives of the conspiracy. The degree of criminal intent necessary for participation in a conspiracy must be *at least* equal to that required for the substantive offense itself. *Malatesta.* More specifically, to convict for conspiracy to violate RICO the government must prove that the person objectively manifested, through words or actions, an agreement to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through the commission of two or more predicate crimes. *Bright* and *Elliott.*

2. Mail Fraud Convictions

[62, 63] The elements of the offense of mail fraud have been discussed in numerous decisions in this circuit, including the concise distillation in *United States v. Green*, 494 F.2d 820, 823–24 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 419 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 325, 42 L.Ed.2d 280 (1974):

> The two basic elements of a mail fraud scheme are (1) the scheme to defraud, and (2) causing a mailing for the purpose of executing the scheme. While the mailing must, as the statute requires, be "for the purpose of executing the scheme . . . [i]t is not necessary that the scheme contemplate the use of the mails as an essential element. Indeed, it is sufficient if the mailing that is caused is "a part of the execution of the fraud," or is "incident to an essential part of the scheme." One "causes" the mails to be used when one "does an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended." (Citations omitted.)

Thus, it is clear that if there is sufficient evidence to connect a defendant to the fraudulent scheme involving use of the mails, it is not necessary that he do any of the mailing. Co-schemers are jointly responsible for each other's acts when the acts are within the general scope and in furtherance of the scheme. *United States v. Rodgers*, 624 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1980).

With these elements and standards in mind, we examine the claims of the various defendants that the evidence was insufficient to justify their convictions.

THE ARSONISTS

Frank Scionti:

[64] Scionti was found guilty on both RICO counts (Counts 1 and 2) and on four counts of mail fraud (Counts 3, 4, 5 and 6). Counts 3 and 4 dealt with the fire at 1811 Taliaferro Street. Counts 5 and 6 pertained to the laundromat fire in Miami. Scionti does not specifically assert that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on the mail fraud counts. The jury's verdict is therefore not challenged on those four counts. Furthermore, he concedes that the evidence was sufficient to support his convictions if the testimony of Noriega is to be accepted. His argument that Noriega was incompetent as a witness and because of his mental condition could not be considered credible as a matter of law, has been discussed and decided adversely to him. *See United States v. Parker*, 586 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied*, 441 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 2408, 60 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1979); *Jackson, supra*. We affirm Scionti's convictions.

Paul Guarino:

[65, 66] Guarino was convicted on both RICO counts and on fifteen counts of mail fraud. He does not specifically challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on any count. In his brief, he posits the "Statement of Issues," which does not question the sufficiency of the evidence, and then adopts the arguments advanced by the co-defendants in support of those issues and any other issues they raised that may apply to him. Although this is not an appropriate challenge to the adequacy of the evidence, we have made a general review of the evidence against Guarino and find it sufficient to convict him on the RICO counts and thirteen of the mail fraud counts. As to Counts 17 and 18, for the reasons discussed *infra*, with respect to defendant Lostracco, we reverse Guarino's convictions. The evidence does not establish that the charged mail frauds occurred.

THE FINANCIERS

Berton B. Chase:

Chase is the only defendant charged solely with conspiracy. He argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because it showed an agreement to commit only one predicate act rather than the requisite "pattern of racketeering activity." We agree.

Chase was indicted because of his involvement in the arson of a warehouse located on 12th Street in Tampa. Martino had a ninety day option on the building. Noriega and Guarino acquired the option from Martino and upon exercising it, put title in the name of Alex Fekete, an unindicted co-conspirator who testified as a government witness. As part of the purchase arrangements, Fekete gave the seller a first mortgage covering the credit portion. Insurance coverage was to be transferred to Fekete and additional coverage was obtained. When more money was needed for building repairs, Chase was approached. He arranged for a loan of $12,000 by a client, secured by a second mortgage on the property, and received $6,000 as a "kickback." The mortgage was to be paid with insurance proceeds expected from the planned arson.

Fekete was to maintain the insurance coverages, however, he became delinquent in paying the premiums. The seller paid the premiums on the original policy and threatened to foreclose on his mortgage unless he was reimbursed for the money advanced. In order to prevent the foreclosure, and to protect his client's interest as holder of the second mortgage, Chase reimbursed the seller.

An attempt was later made to transfer title from Fekete to the second mortgage holder. Before the transfer was completed, and pursuant to Chase's instructions, Noriega burned the warehouse. Because Fekete had failed to pay the premiums on the additional insurance he had secured, only the insurance the seller had purchased was collected.

The evidence appears sufficient to convict Chase of arson or of conspiring to commit

that offense, but those are not the charges for which he stood trial. He was charged and convicted of conspiring to participate in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. As pointed out in *Elliott*, 571 F.2d at 902, "the object of a RICO conspiracy is to violate a substantive RICO provision . . . and not merely to commit each of the predicate crimes necessary to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity." One who does not agree to do that vital element—participate in the enterprise through the commission of at least two predicate acts—cannot be convicted on a RICO conspiracy charge. In effect there are two agreements contained in a RICO conspiracy charge: an agreement to participate and an agreement to commit at least two proscribed acts.

A review of the evidence reflects that Chase agreed to arrange a loan secured by mortgage on a building, with the knowledge the building would be burned and the mortgage would be paid with a portion of the insurance proceeds. He received a "kickback" for his efforts. According to Noriega, Chase set the time for the fire. Chase also acted to protect Fekete's ownership of the building by reimbursing the seller's insurance premiums in order to avoid foreclosure on the first mortgage.

[67] The only agreement which may be classified as an agreement to commit a predicate crime as defined in § 1961 is Chase's agreement to commit arson. Chase was not charged with mail fraud. There was no mail fraud committed in connection with that arson because the only insurance claim submitted was that of the former owner/mortgagee on a legitimate policy. The only predicate act enumerated in the indictment implicating Chase involves the arson of the warehouse.

Absent a charge and proof of an agreement to commit two of the specified predicate crimes, a defendant cannot be convicted of conspiring to participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Chase's conviction for conspiring to violate RICO is invalidly based and must be reversed.

Sam Martino:

Martino does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on his convictions of the mail fraud counts (Counts 14, 15 and 16). With respect to the RICO convictions, Martino argues that as a mere customer of the services offered by the enterprise, his conduct did not fall within the proscription of RICO. The evidence establishes that Martino was more than a customer of the enterprise, he was a recurring figure in the activities of the enterprise.[15] As a real estate agent and mortgage broker, Martino played a multifaceted role. The evidence shows that he assisted in the acquisition of three properties in Tampa that were considered suitable for burning.

The property located at 2020 E. Columbus was purchased by Noriega through the assistance of Martino. The prior owner had been making mortgage payments to Martino's Ybor Loan Company but sold the house because of tax problems and because it became apparent that costly repairs would have to be made to avoid condemnation by housing inspectors. The first mortgage on the house was assumed by Noriega and an existing $4,000 insurance policy was transferred to him. Noriega doubled the existing coverage before acquiring two additional policies, each affording $15,000 protection. Carter was instrumental in obtaining the additional insurance. Four months after the house was acquired, it was burned by Noriega and Guarino and insurance pro-

15. Martino points to his acquittal on several counts as support for his argument that his limited contacts with the enterprise, evidenced by his conviction on charges relating to only one fire, did not amount to participating in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise. While the jury may not have found that the government proved Martino's guilt in the mail fraud scheme, that does not necessarily mean that the jury did not believe that Martino was somehow involved. The evidence of his involvement, while not sufficient to convict for mail fraud, would support the conclusion that he was associated with the enterprise and a participant in the conduct of its affairs.

ceeds were collected on the policies.[16] Martino had ordered the cancellation of the $8,000 policy transferred from the prior owner although the order did not go into effect until after the fire. The mortgages held by Martino's loan company were paid with insurance proceeds.

With the help of Martino, Noriega was able to purchase additional substandard property located at 3006 N. Nebraska.[17] Martino initially arranged a loan to Noriega for $7,000, taking a "kickback" of $1,500. Later, when money was needed for repair work, Martino arranged a $1,500 loan secured by a second mortgage. Noriega then sold the property to Macaluso, paying the mortgage with the proceeds of the sale.

Martino also had a connection with the warehouse discussed earlier. He initially leased the property for one year and had a ninety day option. His original plans were to over-insure the building and then burn it. These plans changed and he sold his interest in the property to Noriega and Guarino and assigned the option.

[68] The evidence reflects more than Martino's mere association with the enterprise; it shows that he played an important role by assisting in the acquisition of properties suitable for burning. His participation in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise is further evidenced by his conviction on the three counts of mail fraud. We affirm his conviction on Count 2. The evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction on Count 1. The requisite element of agreement is apparent from his actions.

THE MISGUIDED ENTREPRENEURS

Amalia Morgado:

[69, 70] Morgado does more than claim that the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions on Counts 21 and 22; she argues that there is *no* evidence that she placed or caused to be placed, in the United States mail, the Proof of Loss which is the subject of those counts. After reviewing the record, we agree that there was no evidence offered showing that Mrs. Morgado personally mailed the Proof of Loss. Such evidence is not required, however, to support the convictions on the mail fraud counts. "It is well settled in this circuit that so long as one participant in a fraudulent scheme causes a use of the mails in execution of the fraud, all other knowing participants in the scheme are legally liable for that use of the mails." *United States v. Toney*, 598 F.2d 1349, 1355 (5th Cir. 1979), *cert. denied*, 444 U.S. 1033, 100 S.Ct. 706, 62 L.Ed. 670 (1980). The evidence shows that Morgado was involved with several other defendants in the scheme to defraud the insurer through the arson of the Vasconia Street property. The mail fraud convictions are supported by the requisite evidence.

[71] The evidence, viewed through the mandated appellate prism, shows that Morgado served on the "marketing" staff of the enterprise as a connection between persons wanting to burn their property and the arsonists. She was instrumental in arranging for Noriega to burn the Vasconia Street property owned by co-defendant John Alan Holt. She made the initial contacts and paid Noriega for his services with checks written on her personal account. Her participation in at least the initial stages of the fraudulent scheme is apparent. Once she became involved in the scheme, she had to do some affirmative act of withdrawal before she may disclaim responsibility for the subsequent acts of her co-schemers. *United States v. Bradsby*, 628 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1980). There is no evidence of any affirmative action on the part of Morgado to withdraw from the scheme.

[72] Having concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict Morgado on the two counts of mail fraud, we examine her convictions on the RICO substantive and conspiracy counts. Morgado was involved in arson and mail fraud, both of which are statutorily designated predicate crimes and

16. Martino was convicted on three mail fraud counts relating to the fire at this location.

17. Martino was acquitted on the mail fraud counts relating to this property.

base the charge that she engaged in a "pattern of racketeering activity." The final inquiry is whether Morgado's association with the enterprise has been established. The evidence implicated Morgado in another Tampa arson that was not included in the mail fraud counts. Again acting as the "marketing" person for the enterprise, Morgado arranged for her sister to buy substandard property which later was burned. Her sister recovered under a fire insurance policy after Morgado acted as notary on the Proof of Loss. Morgado was associated with the enterprise; she worked at furthering the business in which the enterprise was engaged. Convinced that the evidence sufficiently establishes all of the elements required for a RICO substantive offense, we affirm Morgado's conviction on Count 2. The evidence also establishes the required element of agreement, accordingly, Morgado's conviction on Count 1 is also affirmed.

Joseph Macaluso:

Macaluso was convicted on both RICO counts and on five counts of mail fraud. His challenges to the mail fraud convictions stem from a variance between the indictment and the proof adduced at trial and point to an alleged inconsistency in the verdicts with respect to other defendants also charged in the counts.

[73, 74] Counts 11, 12 and 13 arose out of the arson and subsequent collection of insurance proceeds for property located on N. Nebraska. The indictment charged Macaluso, Morgado, Martino, Carter, Guarino and Noriega. The jury acquitted Martino, Morgado and Guarino on these counts. Noriega and Carter pled guilty. Macaluso argues that the verdicts necessarily indicate that the jury rejected Noriega and Carter as credible witnesses and, therefore, his conviction must be reversed because it is inconsistent with the verdicts on the others. We do not agree. A similar argument was rejected in *United States v. Dubea*, 612 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1980), and in *United States v. Michel*, 588 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 444 U.S. 825, 100 S.Ct. 47, 62 L.Ed.2d 32 (1979). Our inquiry on appeal is limited to determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the counts on which the appellant was convicted; we do not look at what the jury did with other counts or other defendants. Because the jury may have chosen not to believe Carter and Noriega with respect to the other defendants does not mean that they had to find those witnesses not credible as to their testimony concerning Macaluso. Reviewing the evidence against Macaluso, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support his convictions on Counts 11, 12 and 13. Those convictions are affirmed.

Counts 7 and 8 charge mail fraud with respect to the arson and subsequent collection of insurance proceeds for property located at the corner of 10th Street and 12th Avenue. Macaluso challenges his conviction specifically on Count 8 because, while the indictment charged that the object of the Count 8 mail fraud was mailed from New York to Jacksonville, the evidence showed that the mailing occurred between Jacksonville and Tampa. This inconsistency, it is argued, prejudiced Macaluso's substantial rights to the extent that a reversal is warranted.

[75, 76] We find a variance between the indictment and the evidence as to the specific mailing locations involved in Count 8. We do not agree, however, that this variance affected Macaluso's substantial rights. The addresses of the sender and addressee were not the only information set forth in Count 8. The indictment also set out the numbers of the drafts that were sent through the mail, the names of the payees, and the amounts involved. All of this information was correct. The variance in *United States v. Cook*, 586 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied*, 442 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 2821, 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979), where the indictment charged a mailing to the United States Air Force and the evidence showed the mailing went to the General Services Administration, was considered a "technical variance . . . best relegated to the 'immaterial' category." *Id.* at 575. Considering the totality of the circumstances at bar, this expression from *Cook* applies. The vari-

ance Macaluso notes is not reversible error. Macaluso does not point to any specifics with regard to the claim of insufficient evidence as to Count 7. Our general review discloses the evidence is sufficient. The convictions on Counts 7 and 8 are affirmed.

[77] With regard to his RICO convictions, Macaluso argues that if he was involved in a conspiracy, it was for the limited purpose of aiding in the arson. Our review of the evidence results in a contrary conclusion. The arsons in which Macaluso was involved were part of the main business of the enterprise. He acted as the go-between or contact person for the arson of the 10th Street and 12th Avenue property, and he participated in its burning. He was also the owner of the N. Nebraska property that was burned. Several members of the enterprise were involved in those incidents. We are persuaded that the evidence establishes Macaluso's active involvement in the affairs of the enterprise.

Macaluso's final contention is that the evidence did not show he intended to further the affairs of the enterprise. This argument is without merit. By his active involvement Macaluso did further the enterprise's affairs. We affirm Macaluso's convictions on Counts 1 and 2.

John Lostracco:

Lostracco was convicted on RICO Counts 1 and 2 and mail fraud Counts 17 and 18. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. We agree.

[78] An arson committed at a 27th Street address provides the basis for the mail fraud charges. The property was owned by Lostracco's brother-in-law and sister-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Bartolotti. Lostracco acted as the real estate agent for the proposed sale from the Bartolottis to Noriega and Guarino. Title to the property was to be put in the name of Jimmy Traina, who was to share the fire insurance proceeds with Noriega and Guarino. The Bartolottis were aware only of Traina's interest. Although a contract to sell was executed, the plans went awry when Noriega burned the house before title actually passed to Traina. At the time of the arson the Bartolottis still owned the property and were the insureds under an insurance policy. There is no evidence that the Bartolottis were involved in the arson or had any knowledge of the plan to burn the building for the insurance.

After learning that the property had been burned and that they were still the owners, the Bartolottis submitted their insurance claim. This claim was not fraudulent; their policy was valid and they were not aware of the arson. Counts 17 and 18 charge Lostracco with mail fraud in connection with the sworn statement in the Bartolotti Proof of Loss and the insurer's draft issued to the Bartolottis. There is no evidence that the Bartolottis submitted a claim under their policy intending to deliver over or share the insurance payment with any member of the enterprise. To the contrary, the evidence reflects that Noriega, Guarino and Traina received the insurance proceeds only after threatening and pressuring the Bartolottis.

[79] There is no evidence of Lostracco's involvement in a mail fraud scheme centered on the Bartolottis' 27th Street property because no mail fraud occurred. If the sale had been consummated as planned, and if Traina had collected on the fire policy, a mail fraud would have been perpetrated. Under those circumstances, if Traina had not been able to collect for some reason, the government still could have proven mail fraud because success of the scheme is not required for a conviction. The government takes the position that the facts present an unsuccessful mail fraud scheme and, therefore, Lostracco's convictions must stand. The evidence does not support that conclusion. The Bartolotti claim and the payment to them cannot be transformed into mail fraud and imputed to the enterprise. The previously discussed rule that co-schemers are jointly responsible does not apply because there is no evidence that the Bartolottis were co-schemers. Lostracco's convictions on Counts 17 and 18 must be reversed.

[80] In order to be convicted on a RICO substantive charge under § 1962(c), there

must be evidence that the defendant participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity which requires the commission of two predicate crimes. The evidence supports findings that Lostracco participated in the arson and in discussions which could lead to mail fraud. Section 1961(1)(B) lists mail fraud as a predicate offense; conspiracy to commit mail fraud is not included and is therefore not a predicate act. The evidence establishes that Lostracco committed only one predicate act. Accordingly, his conviction on Count 2 must be reversed.

Having found that Lostracco is not guilty of the RICO substantive offense because he did not commit two predicate acts, we must now inquire whether the indictment charged and the evidence proved that he agreed to commit two recognized predicate acts. The two acts of racketeering charged are the arson at the 27th Street address and the alleged mail fraud resulting from the insurance claim by the Bartolottis.

[81] There was no mail fraud committed when the Bartolottis made their fire loss claim. Consequently, Lostracco's involvement in that claim could not constitute an agreement to commit a criminal act. We are cognizant that the evidence reflects a plan by Lostracco and others to commit arson and mail fraud. The mail fraud which was a part of that plan, however, is not the mail fraud charged in the indictment.

A RICO conspiracy conviction requires that the indictment charge and the proof establish the two predicate crimes agreed to. The evidence does not support the charged mail fraud and Lostracco's conviction on Count 1 must be reversed.

THE DISSATISFIED OWNERS

John Alan Holt:

Holt's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his mail fraud convictions is based on the government's alleged failure to prove that venue was proper as to Count 21 and the asserted lack of evidence that Holt mailed or caused to be mailed the items named in Counts 21 and 22.

[82, 83] Venue for a mail fraud conviction is proper in any of the districts from, through, or into which the item of mail moved. 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). The government had to show that the Proof of Loss for Holt's insurance claim was either mailed from the Middle District of Florida, mailed to the Middle District of Florida, or that it passed through the Middle District of Florida as it traveled to its destination. The burden of proof to establish venue is not as onerous as the burden required for proof of an element of a crime. Venue need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. As long as there is circumstantial evidence in the record supporting the inference that the crime was committed in the district where the trial is held, direct evidence is not required. *United States v. White*, 611 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1980); *United States v. Turner*, 586 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1978), *cert. denied*, 440 U.S. 926, 99 S.Ct. 1258, 59 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979).

[84] The subject of the mail fraud charged in Count 21 is a sworn Proof of Loss signed by Holt which was mailed by the office of the Safeco Insurance Company in Tampa to the Safeco Insurance Company in Atlanta. Holt argues that there is no evidence showing where Safeco in Tampa had mailed the item or where Safeco in Atlanta had received it. This argument is not supported by the record. Dale Jermyn, the former claims manager for the Tampa Safeco office, testified that after the original Proof of Loss was received in his office, it was customary to send it by mail to the Atlanta division office. He further testified that, with respect to the specific Proof of Loss at issue here, the original had been mailed to the Atlanta office by Mr. Parker, the Tampa office adjuster. Holt underscores that Jermyn did not specifically testify that the item was mailed from the Tampa post office. We cannot accept Holt's argument that the jury could just as easily have inferred that Mr. Parker chose to go outside of Tampa and the judicial district, to mail the document. Nor can we accept the suggestion that the document mailed to

the Atlanta office was received somewhere other than Atlanta. Under the facts reflected in this record, the most obvious and compelling inference is that the item was mailed in Tampa and received in Atlanta. Venue properly lies in the Middle District of Florida.

[85, 86] Holt's second argument is based on the absence of testimony pointing to his mailing or causing to be mailed the Proofs of Loss. This argument founders on the rubrics expressed in our prior decisions which speak to the evidence required to sustain mail fraud convictions. It was not necessary to prove that Holt actually did the mailing, "he need only have had a reasonable basis to foresee that his actions would result in the use of the mails." *United States v. Georgalis*, 631 F.2d 1199, 1206 (5th Cir. 1980); *Toney, supra; Banister v. United States*, 379 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1967). Though one lacks the actual intent to use the mails, one "causes" the mails to be used when he acts with the knowledge that the mails will be used in the ordinary course of business. *Pereria v. United States*, 347 U.S. 1, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954).

[87] The facts surrounding the mail fraud counts against Holt are very similar to those which were before the court in *Banister, supra*. Holt argues that Count 21 charges the sending by one insurance agent of a Proof of Loss to another insurance agent, a mailing with which he had absolutely nothing to do. As to Count 22, he argues that there is no evidence that the attorney who claimed to be representing Holt in sending the Proof of Loss to the insurance agent was acting at Holt's direction. This argument was unsuccessfully urged in *Banister*, where we found that the jury could have reasonably inferred that when the defendants dealt with a local agent of an insurance company, they reasonably should have contemplated that the mails would be used when the local agent dealt with the home company. Likewise, the jury in this case reasonably could have inferred that in filing a claim with his local insurer, Holt should have known that the mails would be used in the processing of his claim. We find sufficient evidence to support Holt's convictions on the mail fraud counts.

[88] Holt's objections to his RICO convictions focus on his level of involvement and the number of people with whom he was involved. He does not deny that an enterprise engaged in the business of burning property with the intent to defraud insurance companies existed; he argues, rather, that the evidence showed his involvement was limited to an association with Noriega, not an association with the overall enterprise. The evidence does not support this argument. Holt's involvement extended beyond an association with Noriega and included contacts with at least Morgado. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to infer that Holt was associated with the enterprise. Once established that he was connected with the enterprise, his participation in the conduct of its affairs was proved by evidence of the arson and the mail frauds. Holt's conviction on Count 2, therefore, is affirmed. Affirmance of the Count 1 conviction for agreeing to participate necessarily follows for the reasons and on the authorities previously discussed.

Rolando Gonzales Rodriguez:

Rodriguez stands convicted on four counts: the two RICO counts and Counts 7 and 8 of the mail fraud charges. He adopts by reference the arguments made by his co-defendants with respect to Counts 1, 2 and 7; with respect to Count 8, he relies on the variance argument presented by Macaluso. We have rejected the variance argument and Rodriguez's conviction on Count 8 is affirmed.

[89] Rodriguez's convictions arose out of the arson of property he owned on the corner of 10th Street and 12th Avenue. Macaluso put Rodriguez in touch with Noriega. After agreeing to undertake the "torching," Noriega enlisted the help of Guarino and Macaluso. The fire was only partially successful, but with Carter's help in adjusting the claim, $500 was received from the insurer. Rodriguez does not point

to any specifics with respect to his claim of insufficient evidence to support his convictions on Counts 1, 2 and 7. After making a general review of the evidence, we are persuaded that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that Rodriguez was guilty of the mail fraud charged in Count 7, as well as his guilt of the RICO charges in Counts 1 and 2. His convictions are affirmed.

Joseph Lazzara:

Lazzara was convicted on Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6. The charges arose out of the burning of a Miami laundromat owned by Lazzara. We find the evidence sufficient to support the four convictions and affirm.

[90] With respect to the mail fraud convictions, Lazzara argues that because no one in the enterprise did the mailing or assisted him in processing his claim, the mailings were not affairs of the enterprise and therefore he should not have been convicted. The acts of mail fraud for which he was convicted directly followed the arson that was committed by the enterprise; the fraudulent collection on the insurance policy was part of the scheme. It was not necessary that members of the enterprise be involved in the actual filing of the claim. Mail fraud is listed as one of the designated predicate crimes; the mail frauds charged herein were clearly related to the affairs of the enterprise. *See Bright, supra.* Lazzara's argument to the contrary is infirm.

[91] Lazzara's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for RICO violations is based on an erroneous interpretation of what is required for a RICO conviction. He argues that the phrase "to conduct or participate in the conduct" of the affairs of an enterprise means that the person must be involved in the control or management of the enterprise. This contention has been proffered and rejected. *See Tucker, supra.* Section 1962(c) reaches persons employed by or associated with the enterprise who are not involved in management. It was not necessary to show that Lazzara was in a management position for a conviction under RICO. The evidence was sufficient to show his association with the enterprise and participation in its affairs through the arson and mail fraud activities. We affirm Lazzara's conviction on Count 2.

Our affirmance of Lazzara's conviction on Count 2 leads inexorably to affirmance of his conviction on Count 1 for the reasons previously articulated.

Rosario Palermo:

[92] The jury convicted Palermo on Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4. His appeal on the claim of insufficient evidence, aimed only at the RICO convictions, is multi-faceted. He claims: (1) that the single act of arson in which he was involved did not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) that a customer of the arson services offered by the enterprise does not fall within the category of associates of the enterprise participating in the conduct of its affairs; and (3) that if his conduct amounted to conspiratorial behavior, it was a limited conspiracy separate and apart from the one alleged in the indictment. Palermo does not specifically challenge the mail fraud convictions. Having examined the evidence generally, we affirm his convictions on Counts 3 and 4.

Property located on Taliaferro Street grounded Palermo's involvement and convictions. Although Guarino was part owner of the property it was recorded only in Palermo's name. They purchased the building in March 1973 and the existing insurance coverage was transferred to Palermo. The property was partially burned shortly thereafter and insurance was recovered for the damage. In August 1973 Palermo obtained additional insurance on the house after making certain repairs necessitated by the previous fire. In late September Noriega, assisted by Guarino and Scionti, burned the house. The insurance company paid the full face value of the policy.

[93] Palermo's first argument is without merit. The alleged "single act of arson committed to defraud an insurance company" actually consisted of the arson and two acts of mail fraud in the collection on the insurance policy. Contrary to Palermo's

suggestion, the two acts of mail fraud were more than "intertwined events" or "incidental statutory violations" arising out of the arson. The arson and mail frauds were evidence of the predicate crimes related to the affairs of the enterprise, thus meeting the requirements for proving a pattern of racketeering activity. *See Bright, supra; United States v. Morris*, 532 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1976).

[94] Palermo's second argument is likewise rejected. Palermo was not a mere "customer" of an enterprise offering arson services; he was a part of the enterprise itself, as charged in the indictment. The "enterprise" of which Palermo claims to have been only a customer was not a duly formed corporation with elected officers and annual meetings. It was "an amoeba-like infra-structure," *Elliott*, 571 F.2d at 898, involved in a network of secret criminal activity. Congress decreed that by committing two of the designated predicate crimes related to the affairs of the "enterprise," a person participates in the enterprise and thus violates RICO. As distinguished from the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952, and the provision relative to illegal gambling businesses, 18 U.S.C. § 1955, both of which do not reach customers, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 does contemplate the prosecution of those "customers" who engage in a pattern of racketeering activity in furtherance of the affairs of the enterprise. By definition such a person becomes more than a customer of the enterprise.

[95] We also reject Palermo's third argument that his was a limited conspiracy and not the one charged in the indictment. Each arson and subsequent mail fraud committed by the various defendants was a piece of the overall scheme. Palermo's alleged separate conspiracy was not a separate conspiracy at all; it was an integral part of the arson enterprise at work in Tampa. *See Diecidue, supra.* We affirm Palermo's convictions.

18. Martino was charged in Counts 9 and 10 with Farina but was acquitted on those mail fraud charges.

John Fisher:

Fisher stands convicted on Counts 1, 2, 32 and 33, based on his involvement in the N. Armenia Street fire. His challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is based solely on Noriega's alleged incompetence and lack of credibility as a matter of law. That issue has been discussed and resolved adversely to Fisher. His convictions are affirmed.

Jimmy Farina:

Farina, a former Captain with the Tampa Fire Department, stands convicted of the two RICO counts and of mail fraud Counts 9 and 10. The convictions are based on the arson involving Farina's property on 20th Avenue in Tampa.

The evidence reflects that Farina met with Noreiga and Martino to discuss the acquisition of certain property located off Bayshore Boulevard in Tampa. Their plans were to insure and then burn the property to collect the insurance. The property was to be put in Noriega's name because no property titled in his name had been burned as of that time. These plans were aborted.[18] During discussions concerning other property, Farina made known that he wanted his 20th Avenue building burned. The building was insured for $4,000 and Farina agreed to pay Noriega 10% to burn it. Noriega and Guarino subsequently set fire to the premises. Farino submitted a claim on his policy and recovered the full $4,000. Noriega was paid $400.

[96–98] Farina contends that the evidence offered was insufficient to prove that he was associated with the enterprise, participated in the conduct of its affairs or conspired with its members. He argues that albeit he purchased Noriega's services, he could not have joined the enterprise because the evidence does not show he had knowledge that Noriega acted in concert with others. The jury may draw the natural inferences arising from evidence, including an inference of association, and was

entitled to infer that Farina, while dealing directly only with Noriega and possibly Martino, was aware of the existence of the ongoing arson operation. Farina approached Noriega with the suggestion that they acquire, insure and burn property, as well as the suggestion that his property on 20th Avenue be torched. It is reasonable to infer from that evidence that Farina indeed knew about the person with whom he was dealing. "A party to a conspiracy need not know the identity, or even the number, of his confederates." *Elliott*, 571 F.2d at 903, *quoting United States v. Andolschek*, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir. 1944). The government did not have to prove that Farina knew all of the details or the full extent of the enterprise; proving knowledge of the essential nature was sufficient. Furthermore, "[w]hen a person 'embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common purposes as he understands them.'" 571 F.2d at 904. The jury could reasonably infer that by his dealings with Noriega, Farina joined in the activities of the enterprise. That conclusion leads to the inquiry whether Farina can be convicted of a RICO violation when the evidence reflects participation in only one arson. We have answered this inquiry in the affirmative. Once Farina joined the conspiracy, he could "withdraw," but only by taking some affirmative action to defeat or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy. *United States v. Killian*, 639 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1981); *Bradsby, supra*. The one claiming withdrawal has the burden of proof. The evidence does not establish withdrawal by Farina. Farina also argues that his participation in the arson and mail frauds constituted a singular criminal episode which does not constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity." This argument has also previously been discussed and rejected.

We find the evidence sufficient to support Farina's convictions on Counts 1, 2, 9 and 10.

William H. Brown:

The jury found Brown guilty of Counts 1, 2, 30 and 31. His challenge on appeal targets the convictions on Counts 1 and 2. He argues that the government did not prove the required two predicate acts and, therefore, he could not be found guilty of violating RICO. We disagree.

[99] Brown bifurcates his argument. First, he contends that his alleged involvement in the fire on Lopez Drive did not amount to a predicate act. The evidence shows that Brown provided Noriega with transportation to and from the site of that arson, waiting nearby while Noriega did his work. Brown denies any knowledge of Noriega's purpose in visiting that address that day. We need not decide whether Brown was guilty of aiding and abetting in that arson because the evidence of his involvement in the burning of his hardware store is sufficient to establish that he engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity.

Brown's convictions are based on the arson of his hardware store located on S. Westshore Boulevard in Tampa. He does not deny that he had the store burned. Instead, he takes the position that the hardware store arson is a single predicate act which is insufficient to support a RICO conviction. This argument has been previously advanced and rejected. Brown's convictions on Counts 1, 2, 30 and 31 are affirmed.

Robert Young:

Young's involvement in the arson on N. Armenia Street served as the basis for his convictions on Counts 1, 2, 32 and 33. Young takes the position that the only evidence having any tendency sufficiently to establish his guilt is the testimony of Noriega. He then argues that Noriega was incompetent as a witness for two reasons: (1) based on the psychiatric testimony produced at trial, Noriega was not credible as a matter of law, and (2) because Noriega had already become a government informant by the time the arson occurred on N. Armenia Street, he was incapable of providing the other part of a conspiracy.

[100] Young's first argument has already been discussed and rejected. We

likewise reject Young's second argument. From the record it is unclear exactly when Noriega began to talk to state and federal authorities. Tampa Fire Marshal Bertrand O. Fox testified that Noriega first began to cooperate with the FBI in 1975. Noriega testified that his first meeting with government authorities occurred in early 1976, but that the parties involved were not able to reach an agreement at that time and that he did not begin cooperating with them until several months later. While there obviously is a conflict in the evidence as to exactly when Noriega became a government informant, the answer to that question is not as significant as Young suggests. His reliance on *United States v. Chase*, 372 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 387 U.S. 907, 87 S.Ct. 1688, 18 L.Ed.2d 626; 387 U.S. 913, 87 S.Ct. 1701, 18 L.Ed.2d 635 (1967), is misplaced. That case stands for the proposition that "one who acts as a government agent and enters into a purported conspiracy in the secret role of an informer cannot be a co-conspirator." *Id.* at 459, *citing Sears v. United States*, 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965). The rule applies in situations where the conspiracy involves only a defendant and a government informer. In that situation there can be no conspiracy because it takes two to conspire and the government informer is not a true conspirator. *Sears, supra.*

[101] The conspiracy involving Young included others besides Noriega. For example, Young conspired with John Fisher. His position is not governed by the rule of *Sears*; rather, it comes within the ambit of the rule stated in *Sigers v. United States*, 321 F.2d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 1963), that "a conspiracy may be proved even though the link connecting many of the activities of the conspirators is a Government informer." *See also United States v. Klein*, 560 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1977), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 1073, 98 S.Ct. 1259, 55 L.Ed.2d 777 (1978).

Young argues that justice demands that his convictions on the mail fraud counts, Counts 34 and 35, be reversed because there was no evidence to show that he asked, requested or insisted that the insurance agent use the mails in processing the claim. Further, since John Fisher filed the claim, Young denies any responsibility for the fraud.

[102] This argument is not persuasive. As noted earlier, it was not necessary that Young actually do the mailing or instruct another to use the mails in order to be guilty of mail fraud. An individual participant in a scheme encompassing mail fraud will be liable for the acts of his co-schemers when such acts are within the general scope of the scheme. He can disclaim responsibility only if he undertakes some affirmative act of withdrawal. *Rodgers, supra.*

[103, 104] Furthermore, it is well settled that one "causes" the use of the mails when he does some act in which it is reasonably foreseeable that the mails will be used. *United States v. Crockett*, 534 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1976). Because Young was in the insurance business, it cannot seriously be contended that he was unaware that the mail would probably be used in processing a claim. The evidence showed that Young was part of the scheme to burn the N. Armenia Street property and recover the insurance proceeds. The convictions of Young are affirmed.

Joseph C. Russello:

Russello stands convicted on Counts 1, 2, 28 and 29 as a result of the burning of an office building owned by him on W. Kennedy Boulevard in Tampa. He argues that his convictions must be reversed because the evidence did not show that he was associated with an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. He contends that at most the evidence showed that in connection with the fire, Noriega and Carter were acting independently of each other and independently of the "enterprise." Russello denies any knowledge of the existence of an enterprise as charged in this case. Furthermore, he argues that his two mail fraud convictions do not qualify as a pattern of racketeering activity because they arose out of a single mail fraud scheme and resulted in two separate convic-

tions only because two mailings happened to occur.

[105, 106] We find the evidence sufficient to support the jury's verdicts. Russello's association with Noriega, initially, and then with Carter, supports the inference that he was associated with the enterprise. The enterprise was a group of people who shared the common goal of burning buildings and collecting fire insurance proceeds, and who worked together to achieve that goal. Certainly every member of the group was not involved in every transaction, but every transaction was part of the overall workings of the enterprise to which every member belonged. That Carter and Noriega acted independently in dealing with Russello does not mean that they were not working on behalf of the enterprise. The record reveals sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer that Russello's actions with members of the enterprise qualified as participating in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise. As we stated in *Elliott*: "Under the statute, it is irrelevant that each defendant participated in the enterprise's affairs through different, even unrelated crimes, so long as we may reasonably infer that each crime was intended to further the enterprise's affairs." 571 F.2d at 902–03.

Russello proposes several other issues which have been raised unsuccessfully by his co-defendants. Russello's challenges of his RICO convictions are without merit. We affirm Russello's convictions on Counts 1 and 2.

[107] With respect to the mail fraud convictions, Russello insists that there is a fatal variance between the charge in the indictment and the evidence. Arguably there is some merit to this contention, but we do not find the variance of such substance as to warrant reversal. The indictment charges that Russello, Lazzara, Carter and Noriega devised a scheme to defraud the insurance company by filing a Proof of Loss stating they did not know who set the fire. The government offered evidence that the parties involved knew Noriega had set fire to the building. Testimony also indicated that the building's value listed on the claim was inflated. Russello argues that he was convicted of mail fraud on the latter basis, one not specifically charged in the indictment, and his conviction should be reversed. We disagree. We are not persuaded that the convictions were based on misrepresentation as to value. The reference to value in the testimony of a government witness was almost an aside. Russello offered experts who contradicted the government's suggestion of value. On the other hand the evidence abounds that Carter and Russello falsely denied knowing who set the fire. Russello's convictions on Counts 28 and 29 are affirmed.

Conclusion

The convictions of SCIONTI, MARTINO, MORGADO, MACALUSO, HOLT, LAZZARA, RODRIGUEZ, RUSSELLO, FARINA, BROWN, YOUNG, PALERMO, and FISHER, as per the verdicts of the jury, are AFFIRMED.

The convictions of GUARINO on Counts 17 and 18 are REVERSED; his convictions on all other counts are AFFIRMED.

The conviction of CHASE is REVERSED.

The convictions of LOSTRACCO on Counts 1, 2, 17 and 18 are REVERSED.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Docket Number 79–2606

Martino appeals from the denial of his post-conviction motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. This evidence consisted of proffered testimony by co-defendant Guarino, who stated that he would have testified for Martino in a separate trial but that he did not want to testify in his own defense at the joint trial.

[108] The criteria for obtaining a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence are:

1. the evidence must be discovered following the trial;

2. facts must be alleged from which the court may infer diligence on the part of the movant to discover the new evidence;
3. the evidence must not be merely cumulative or impeaching;
4. the evidence must be material; and
5. the evidence must be such that a new trial would probably produce a new result.

United States v. Rodriguez, 437 F.2d 940 (5th Cir. 1971).

Guarino's proffered statements related to the burning of four buildings. Guarino stated he never discussed burning any of those buildings with Martino and that Martino was unaware of Guarino's interests in the N. Nebraska Avenue and Columbus Drive properties. He also stated that while Martino was aware of Guarino's interest in the warehouse transaction, Noriega's interest was not disclosed to Martino. Guarino denied having ever paid a kickback to Martino, specifically with respect to the Columbus Drive transaction. During his sentencing hearing, Guarino stated to the court that he made a mistake in not testifying during the trial because Martino, contrary to some of the evidence, "didn't have nothing to do with Nebraska or 12th Street."

[109] Guarino's statements do not satisfy the criteria for the granting of a new trial. We need not decide whether newly available evidence is the same as newly discovered evidence because we find that the "new" evidence is not such that a second trial would probably produce a different result. Guarino's statements concerning Martino's lack of knowledge and involvement with respect to the N. Nebraska fire would not produce a new result because Martino was acquitted on charges relating to that fire. The 12th Street warehouse fire was not the subject of a substantive charge; testimony concerning that incident related only to Martino's association with the enterprise. Guarino's statement that Martino knew that he, Guarino, and not Noriega was involved would not be contrary to a jury finding that Martino was associated with the enterprise. It would suffice that Martino and Guarino worked together on the warehouse fire. With respect to the Columbus Drive arson, we find that testimony concerning nondisclosure of Guarino's interest in that property would not likely have changed the jury's verdict. Every member of the enterprise does not have to participate in every transaction engaged in by the enterprise. Furthermore, Guarino's denial of having paid a kickback to Martino for that property is not in direct contradiction to the testimony at trial; Noriega did not testify about a kickback, but rather that they bought out Martino's interest.

[110, 111] The decision to grant or deny a motion for new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence rests in the sound discretion of the trial judge. We will reverse the denial of such a motion only where "it is shown that the ruling was so clearly erroneous as to constitute an abuse of discretion." *United States v. Antone*, 603 F.2d 566, 568 (5th Cir. 1979). That showing has not been made in this case.

The district court's denial of Martino's Motion for New Trial is AFFIRMED.

FORFEITURE

Docket Number 78-3611

[112] The jury returned verdicts ordering the forfeiture of insurance proceeds collected by defendants Russello, Rodriguez, Martino and Guarino. Martino, Russello and Rodriguez appealed the forfeiture orders; Guarino did not.[19] The issue, one of first impression in this court, is whether the term "interest" in 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) includes income or receipts from racketeering activity.

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), a defendant convicted of violating RICO must:

19. Guarino belatedly raises the issue in his brief on appeal of his conviction. This is not sufficient to vest appellate jurisdiction. The order of forfeiture is a different judgment from the sentence and commitment order. A separate notice of appeal was required.

forfeit to the United States (1) any interest he has acquired or maintained in violation of Section 1962, and (2) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influence over, any enterprise which he has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of, in violation of Section 1962.

Rodriguez was ordered to forfeit $4,226.83, Russello's forfeiture was for $340,043.09, and Martino was ordered to forfeit $2,500 together with his ownership, interest and property rights in two companies, Ybor Loan Company and M & S Investment Corporation. The appellants' challenges to the forfeiture orders center on the definition of "interest" as used, but not defined, in the statute. The government takes the position that income or profits from an illegal enterprise are forfeitable under § 1963; appellants contend that § 1963 applies only to an interest in an enterprise. Appellants' position is supported by decisions of other courts.

In *United States v. Meyers*, 432 F.Supp. 456, 461 (W.D.Pa.1977), the court indicated that it would be a "strained construction of Section 1963" to classify profits or fruits received from the enterprise as "interest" in the enterprise or as a claim or right that could afford a source of influence over the enterprise. The court went on to note that "the more natural interpretation is that an 'interest' is akin to a continuing proprietary right in the nature of partnership or stock ownership (or holding a debt or claim, as distinguished from 'equity' investment) rather than mere dividends or distributed profits." *Id.* This interpretation was approved by the court in *United States v. Thevis*, 474 F.Supp. 134, 142 (N.D.Ga.1979), which held that "the limits of forfeiture authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1963 do not embrace fruits or profits derived from the operation of a § 1962 enterprise." Several factors were considered by the court in reaching that conclusion. The different treatment Congress accorded income and interest was noted—§ 1962(a) makes it illegal to invest income derived from racketeering activity in the acquisition of an interest in an enterprise. Congress recognized that income and profits could be generated by racketeering activity but it chose to include in the forfeiture provision only the interest acquired or held and not the income of an enterprise. The *Thevis* opinion also recognized that the "enterprise" concept is the basis of § 1962 and that the forfeiture provision is directed toward an interest acquired or maintained "in violation of Section 1962." Thus the existence of the enterprise is also a cornerstone of § 1963. The court was convinced that the use of the word "interest" was limited to interest in the enterprise. Our colleagues of the Ninth Circuit, in a well-reasoned opinion, recently held that § 1963 applies to interest "in an enterprise" and not to any form of income or proceeds derived from a pattern of racketeering activity. *United States v. Marubeni America Corp.*, 611 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1980).

In reaching our conclusion we are impressed by several considerations. In enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1963, Congress permitted *in personam* forfeitures that had previously been prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 3563. Viewed in that perspective one would expect that Congress would strictly limit forfeitures. In this instance, the limitation would be to the defendant's interest in the enterprise he had corrupted. Such an intent was indicated by the comments of Deputy Attorney General Richard P. Kleindienst before the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and Procedures when he said:

> It is felt that this revival of the concept of forfeiture as a criminal penalty *limited as it is in* § 1963(a) to one's interest in the enterprise which is the subject of the specific offense involved here, and not extending to any other property of the convicted offender, is a matter of congressional wisdom rather than of Constitutional power .... (Emphasis in original.)

Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963—RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, 17 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 379, 385 (1980), *quoting* Measures Relating

to Organized Crime, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1969). Furthermore, had Congress intended to include fruits and profits, it could have specifically provided for such as it did in the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, passed by the same Congress in the same month as RICO. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a)(2) states: "Any person who is convicted under paragraph (1) of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise shall forfeit to the United States—(A) *the profits* obtained by him in such enterprise . . . ." (Emphasis added.)

[113] We are convinced Congress did not intend to include in the forfeiture provision of § 1963 the fruits and profits obtained from a pattern of racketeering activity. We are aware this holding occasions problems with respect to associations in which one cannot own a legal interest, as in the case *sub judice*. This limitation was recognized by the Justice Department when it stated that "there is often nothing to forfeit . . . in the case of individuals associated in fact." *Forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 1963—RICO's Most Powerful Weapon, supra* at 391, *quoting* U.S. Department of Justice, Explanation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Statute 2 (4th ed.). The kind of enterprise will, therefore, be critical in the determination of forfeitable interests.

[114] Having concluded that only interests in an enterprise are subject to forfeiture, we reverse the monetary forfeiture orders against Russello, Rodriguez and Martino. The insurance proceeds they received from the burning of their properties were proceeds or profits from the enterprise; the proceeds did not constitute "interest in an enterprise."

[115] We affirm the order of forfeiture of Martino's interest in his two companies because it falls squarely within the language of § 1963(a)(2) which provides for the forfeiture of any interest affording a source of influence over the enterprise. Both of Martino's companies were active in the enterprise. They provided funds for the arson and fraud ventures. The M & S Investment Corporation purchased property with the intent to burn it, but sold the property to someone else who then burned it. Martino was an active participant; he played an important role within the enterprise, a role made even more effective because of the companies he managed. The Act requires forfeiture of his interest in these companies.

The orders of monetary forfeiture entered against Martino, Russello and Rodriguez are REVERSED. The order of forfeiture of Martino's interest in Ybor Loan Company and M & S Investment Corporation is AFFIRMED.

APPENDIX

As noted below, some fires were listed only as overt acts and/or acts of racketeering in Counts 1 and 2 while others were also the subjects of mail fraud counts (Counts 3 through 35). We list only those fires that are at the core of the convictions appealed. All addresses are in Tampa, Florida, unless otherwise indicated.

1. 1202 E. Buffalo Avenue, a bakery (Counts 1 and 2)—Guarino and Scionti burned the premises with the help of two other arsonists who died as a result of the fire.
2. 3401 24th Street (Counts 1 and 2)—Guarino, Noriega and Scionti burned a frame house owned by Scionti in his brother's name. Scionti received a $4,000 settlement on the insurance policy.
3. 1811 Taliaferro Street (Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4)—Guarino, Noriega and Scionti burned a frame house belonging to Palermo and Guarino (silent partner). This house was burned twice; insurance proceeds were collected by Palermo both times. The first time he collected on a policy transferred to him when he bought the house. After the first fire, he made cosmetic repairs to the house and obtained insurance coverage through a different agency. Af-

APPENDIX—Continued

ter the second fire, he collected the full face value of this policy, $10,000.

4. 20410 Old Cutler Road, Miami (Counts 1, 2, 5 and 6)—Guarino, Scionti and Noriega burned a laundromat belonging to Lazzara. Lazzara received only $15,117 although he submitted a claim for $40,000.

5. 2208 10th Street and 923 12th Avenue (Counts 1, 2, 7 and 8)—Guarino, Noriega and Macaluso burned two adjacent frame buildings owned by Rodriguez. $4,226.83 was collected by Rodriguez through the help of Carter.

6. 2917–2917½ 20th Avenue (Counts 1, 2, 9 and 10)—Noriega and Guarino burned a frame house owned by Farina in his mother's name. Farina received $4,000 in insurance proceeds.

7. 3006 N. Nebraska Avenue (Counts 1, 2, 11, 12 and 13)—Macaluso bought a house from Noriega and had Guarino and Noriega burn it. With help from Carter, $23,000 in insurance proceeds was paid to Macaluso.

8. 2020 E. Columbus Drive (Counts 1, 2, 14, 15 and 16)—Noriega and Guarino burned a frame house acquired by Noriega through the assistance of Martino. With the help of Carter, $20,000 was paid on three different insurance policies, two purchased by Noriega and one transferred to him by the prior owner. The property was later burned again by Noriega and he collected an additional $7,105.77.

9. 2510 12th Street (Counts 1 and 2)—Martino purchased an option on a warehouse with the intent to insure it and then burn it. Necessary repairs were made in order to obtain insurance. Guarino and Noriega then bought the option from Martino and put it in the name of Alex Fekete who exercised the option. An office was set up in the warehouse and a $50,000 insurance policy was obtained (in addition to the $30,000 policy transferred from the previous owner who retained a mortgage position for the credit portion of the sale). When more money was needed to cover repairs, Chase got a loan from a client who was given a second mortgage. Noriega burned the property. Fekete had allowed the additional insurance to lapse by failing to pay the premiums. The insurance recovery on the original insurance was paid to the first mortgage holder.

10. 2114 27th Street (Counts 1, 2, 17 and 18)—Fekete and Noriega burned an apartment owned by a relative of Lostracco (co-worker of Martino in his real estate business). A transfer of the property from Lostracco's brother-in-law to Jimmy Traina (straw man for Noriega and Guarino) was attempted but was not completed before the property was burned. The $4,500 in insurance proceeds was initially paid to Lostracco's brother-in-law, but was later delivered over to Noriega, Guarino and Arrigo.

11. 409 E. Oak Street (Counts 1, 2, 19 and 20)—Guarino and Noriega burned a two-story frame house owned by Guarino. The house had been "placarded" by city housing inspectors prior to the fire. Cosmetic repairs were made to the exterior of the house and with Carter's guidance, insurance was obtained. Following the fire the insurance company refused to pay the face value of the policy. Carter intervened and arranged for a $10,000 settlement.

12. 3310 Vasconia Street (Counts 1, 2, 21 and 22)—Noriega and Arrigo burned a house owned by Holt. Morgado had made the necessary arrangements for Holt. When Holt acquired the property he transferred the existing policy and obtained additional coverage. The first attempt at burning the house was unsuccessful; in the second attempt the building was totally destroyed. Holt claimed $41,501.55 under one policy and $36,501.55 under another.

13. 4601 W. Kennedy Boulevard (Counts 1, 2, 28 and 29)—Noriega and Traina set fire to the Central Professional Building owned by Russello. Insurance coverage on the premises paid $340,043.09 through adjustments made by Carter.

APPENDIX—Continued

14. 3012 Highland Avenue (Counts 1 and 2)—Guarino and Noriega attempted to burn a frame apartment building owned by an acquaintance of Guarino. The fire was spotted by neighbors and extinguished prior to extensive damage.

15. 3658 S. Westshore Boulevard (Counts 1, 2, 31 and 33)—Noriega burned a True Value Hardware Store owned by Bill Brown. Prior to the fire, Brown had obtained $175,000 in additional insurance with the help of Carter. The fire was only partially successful, and though Brown claimed damages of over $100,000, the insurance company estimated the damages at only $15,000 and refused to pay the claim.

16. 1907–1915 N. Armenia Avenue (Counts 1, 2, 32 and 33)—This property was acquired by Fisher and Young through arrangements made by Noriega. After superficial repairs were made, insurance coverage was obtained. The building was heavily damaged by fire and $125,000 was collected from the insurance company.



Maurice WINKLER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COUNTY OF DeKALB, etc., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 80-7313.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit. Unit B

June 19, 1981.

An engineer hired by county water and sewer department filed an action alleging that he had been demoted from his position without due process of law. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, Marvin H. Shoob, J., dismissed for failure to state a claim. Engineer appealed. The Court of Appeals, Vance, Circuit Judge, held that the engineer had a protectible property interest, entitling him to a hearing on the demotion, where the county code indicated to employee that transfers would be to a position whose duties are of the kind or quality encompassed by their classification, it establishes the reasonable expectation that an employee will not be demoted to a position of vastly diminished responsibility for valid cause and the provisions of the code guarantee a hearing in cases of demotions or of prejudicial job actions.

Reversed and remanded.

1. Constitutional Law ⇐252.5

While unilateral expectation of benefit does not rise to level of protected interest, mutually recognized entitlement will receive constitutional protection. U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 5, 14.

2. Constitutional Law ⇐277(2)

Where county code indicated to county employees that transfers would be to position whose duties were of kind or quality encompassed by their classification, code established reasonable expectation that employee would not be demoted to position of vastly diminished responsibilities and that expectation was further enhanced by provisions in code guaranteeing hearing in cases of demotions or prejudicial job action, county code, conduct of engineer hired by county and conduct of county established existence of rules or mutually explicit understandings so that engineer had protectible property interest in his employment. U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5, 14.

3. Constitutional Law ⇐277(1)

Although primary source of property rights is state law, state may not magically declare interest to be "non-property" after the fact for Fourteenth Amendment purposes if, for example, long-standing pattern has established an individual's entitlement

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

UNIT B

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
SEP 17 1981
GILBERT F. GANUCHEAU

NO. 78-5260

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

ROSARIO PALERMO, WILLIAM H. BROWN, a/k/a Bill, JOHN D. FISHER, ROBERT D. YOUNG, JOSEPH MACALUSO, a/k/a Joe, FRANK SCIONTI, JOHN NICHOLAS LOSTRACCO, SAM C. MARTINO, PAUL GUARINO, JIMMY FARINA, BERTON B. CHASE, a/k/a Bert, ROLANDO GONZALES RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a Roland Rodriguez, JOSEPH D. LAZZARA, a/k/a Joe, JOSEPH C. RUSSELLO, a/k/a Joe, and AMALIA MORGADO,

Defendants-Appellants

NO. 79-2606

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

SAM C. MARTINO,

Defendant-Appellant

APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

ON PETITIONS FOR REHEARING
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REHEARING EN BANC

Before TUTTLE, VANCE and POLITZ, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The Petitions for Rehearing filed by the appellee, the United States of America, and by various of the appellants in the above

entitled and numbered causes are DENIED, and no member of this panel nor judge of this court in regular active service having requested that the court be polled on rehearing en banc (Rule 35, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure; local Fifth Circuit Rule 16), the suggestions for rehearing en banc are DENIED.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Henry A. Politz

UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE

CLERK'S NOTE:
SEE RULE 41 FRAP AND LOCAL RULE 17 FOR STAY OF THE MANDATE

81-5700

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

NO.

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

JOSEPH MACALUSO

Petitioner

vs

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

NEWMAN, LEWIS & BERKOWITZ, P.A.
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813/879-2090

Daniel J. Newman

Counsel for Petitioner

81-5700

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1981

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JOSEPH MACALUSO

Petitioner

vs

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Respondent

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED
IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Petitioner Joseph Macaluso moves the Court for an order permitting him to proceed in this Court, in forma pauperis, with his Petition for Writ of Certiorari to review the decision of the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals filed on June 19, 1981 in U. S. v. Martino, et al, 648 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1981) pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §1915 and Rule 46 of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Joseph Macaluso is represented by Daniel J. Newman, who was appointed counsel by the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act of 1964, as amended, 18 U.S.C. §3006 and 18 U.S.C. §3006A. Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 46, Petitioner is not filing an affidavit with this motion.

Leave to proceed in forma pauperis was not sought by Petitioner in the courts below.

Petitioner is entitled to redress by Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, and his petition presents substantial questions. He is seeking relief from his conviction under the RICO statute 18 U.S.C. §1961 et seq.

Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari is being filed with this motion.

NEWMAN, LEWIS & BERKOWITZ, P.A.

BY: Daniel J. Newman

DANIEL J. NEWMAN
206 South Dale Mabry
Tampa, Florida 33609
813/879-2090
ATTORNEYS FOR PETITIONER, JOSEPH MACALUSO

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SUPREME COURT, U.S.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Motion For Leave To Proceed In Forma Pauperis was furnished by U. S. Mail delivery by depositing it in the U.S. Post Office at 5201 Spruce Street, Tampa, Florida, with first class postage prepaid, addressed to all counsel of record listed below, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 28, this 12th day of NOVEMBER, 1981.

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Washington, D.C. 20530
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